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A PRIMER ON FEDERAL FACILITY COMPLIANCE
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS: WHERE DO WE GO
FROM HERE?*
Look, Buster, don't bug me with your crap about permits. I'm
building nuclear weapons.'
Unfortunately, some of the worst [environmental] offenders are our
own federal facilities. As President, I will insist that in the future
federal agencies meet or exceed environmental standards: The gov-
ernment should live within the laws it imposes on others.
2
Pollution caused by facilities owned or operated by various federal
agencies3 is a major contributor to the environmental problems facing the
United States today.4 While capable of causing harm identical to pollution
from a private facility,5 federal facility pollution raises legal issues that
never arise when a private entity pollutes.6 For instance, federal and state
* The author would like to thank Assistant Professor David A. Wirth for his valuable
comments on earlier drafts of this Note.
1. Dan W. Reicher & S. Jacob Scherr, Laying Waste to the Environment, BuLL. OF THE
ATOM. ScimN=sts, Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 31, 31.
2. See H.R. REP. No. 111, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1287, 1288 (attributing remarks to George Bush during 1988 presidential campaign).
3. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing degree of environmental
contamination at DOD and DOE facilities).
4. See infra notes 21-38 and accompanying text (discussing scope and extent of federal
facility pollution).
5. See H.R. RE. No. 141, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1990) (discussing release of 300,000
pounds of radioactive uranium particles into atmosphere from Fernald facility); 139 CONG. REc.
E9 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1993) (statement of Rep. Schaeffer) ("The environment knows no difference
between contamination from federal and private sources...").
6. See generally Michael D. Axline et al., Stones for David's Sling: Civil Penalties in
Citizen's Suits Against Polluting Federal Facilities, 2 J. ENrTL. L. & LrriT. 1 (1987) (examining
CWA, CAA, RCRA and recent case law); Richard E. Lotz, Federal Facilities Provisions of
Federal Environmental Statutes: Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for "Requirements" and Fines
and Penalties, 31 A.F. L. Rnv. 7 (1989) (discussing meaning of "requirements," fines and
penalties, and recent case law); Stan Millan, Federal Facilities and Environmental Compliance:
Toward a Solution, 36 Loy. L. REv. 319 (1990) (discussing constitutional questions presented
by EPA suing sister agencies); Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Federal Agencies?,
17 EcoLoGy L.Q. 317 (1990) (same); Louise M. Gleason & Marie I. Goutzounis, Comment,
Clearing the Air-of Environmental Sovereign Immunity: Ohio v. United States Department of
Energy, 6 ST. JOHN'S J. LEoAL CoMENar. 287 (1991) (discussing facility compliance with
environmental laws and sovereign immunity waivers); Nancy E. Milsten, Note, How Well Can
States Enforce Their Environmental Laws When the Polluter Is the United States Government?,
18 Ru "rEs L.J. 123 (1986) (same); J.B. Wolverton, Note, Sovereign Immunity and National
Priorities: Enforcing Federal Facilities' Compliance with Environmental Statutes, 15 HAEv.
Ewm. L. REv. 565 (1991) (same); Adam Babich, Circumventing Environmental Laws: Does
the Sovereign Have a License to Pollute?, NAT. REsoutcRs & ENV'T, Summer 1991, at 28
(same).
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governments respond swiftly to environmental pollution from private
sources.7 Such action can include injunctive or declaratory relief and
possibly civil and criminal penalties.' Additionally, private polluters cannot
discount a possible citizen's suit.9
When a federal agency is responsible for environmental contamination,
however, statutory and constitutional concerns limit or preclude nearly all
of the enforcement options named above.' 0 Vital enforcement tools such
as state-imposed civil penalties and criminal sanctions on federal actors
implicate sovereign immunity concerns." Federal level enforcement, that
is, enforcement by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) through
administrative orders or civil actions filed in federal district court, against
federal actors raises constitutional concerns such as separation of powers.
12
7. See United States v. Ashland Oil, Inc., [Litigation] 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,399 (W.D. Pa. June 19, 1989) (approving entry of consent decree). On January 2, 1988, an
oil storage tank at one of Ashland's facilities collapsed, spilling about one million gallons of
diesel fuel into the Monongahela River. Id. Six months later, the United States and Pennsylvania,
pursuant to § 309(b) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) and § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act,
filed a complaint against Ashland seeking recovery of costs incurred in cleaning up the spill.
Recent Developments in the Courts, [News & Analysis] 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,491, 10,492 (Nov. 1988). Then, in September 1988, the United States filed a criminal
indictment against Ashland for violation of the CWA. Ashland Oil, [Litigation] 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. at 20,399 n.1. Individuals filed civil damage actions, but not citizen's suits, against
Ashland. See Ashland Oil Would Pay up to $30 Million in Proposed Settlement of Oil Spill
Suits, [Current Dev.] 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1295, 1295 (Nov. 17, 1989) (discussing settlement
of class action law suits). The civil action filed by the United States resulted in a civil penalty
of $4.6 million. Ashland Agrees to Pay $4.6 Million in Penalties, Costs Related to Spill,
[Current Dev.] 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1384, 1384 (Dec. 8, 1989). The criminal action resulted in
a fine of $2.25 million. Largest Oil Spill Fine in History Assessed Against Ashland Oil by
Court, [Current Dev.] 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2473, 2473 (Mar. 17, 1989).
8. See Mike Rothmel, Note, When Will the Federal Government Waive the Sovereign
Immunity Defense and Dispose of its Violations Properly?, 65 Csn.-KET L. REv. 581, 585-86
(1989) (describing enforcement actions that private polluters may face).
9. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1988) (allowing citizen to sue any "person" who
violates effluent standard or administrative order under CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (1988)
(allowing same under RCRA); id. § 7604(a)(1) (1988) (allowing same under CAA).
10. See Elizabeth Cheng, Comment, Lawmaker as Lawbreaker: Assessing Civil Penalties
Against Federal Facilities Under RCRA, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 845, 846 (1990) (noting that federal
agencies seek less stringent treatment under environmental laws); infra notes 53-80 and accom-
panying text (discussing enforcement options available to state and federal enforcers against
federal polluters). The limitation on enforcement options exists despite Congress's desire that
regulators treat federal facilities identically to private facilities. H.R. RaP. No. 111, supra note
2, at 2, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1288.
11. See David W. Goewey, Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance with the RCRA
and Other Environmental Statutes: An Administrative Proposal, 28 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 513,
522-25 (1987) (discussing sovereign immunity); Susan L. Smith, Government Immunity Issues:
Can the King Do No Wrong?, NAT. REsou cas & ENV'T, Summer 1991, at 16, 16 (discussing
three potential immunity defenses). "The basic principal of sovereign immunity is that one
cannot sue the government without its consent." Babich, supra note 6, at 29.
12. See infra notes 171-93 and accompanying text (introducing constitutional concerns
regulators confront in federal facility enforcement). The central question is how far can one
executive branch agency-the EPA for example-go to coerce another executive branch agency-
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This Note will explore the current ability of both state and federal
regulators to enforce environmental laws against federal polluters. Part I
details the extent of the pollution problem at federal facilities. It goes on
to introduce the legal framework that, for the last decade, controlled the
manner in which regulators sought federal compliance. The discussion
reveals the issues that set the stage for two recent developments in the
law of federal facilities compliance.
Part II shifts the focus to those two recent developments, the United
States Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. United States Department of
Energy13 and the enactment of the Federal Facility Compliance Act of
1992 (FFCA). 14 Both Ohio and the FFCA significantly have affected the
availability of remedies against pollution from federal installations. The
Ohio decision limited the remedies available to states in civil enforcement
actions by forbidding states from collecting punitive civil penalties. 5 The
FFCA reversed Ohio on the penalties issue and addressed other problems
that arose from the legal framework that governed federal facility com-
pliance for the last decade.
Part III analyzes the effectiveness of the FFCA. First, Part III ex-
amines the civil penalties provision of the FFCA. Although the FFCA
provides a clear waiver of sovereign immunity, it does not respond to
parts of Ohio's reasoning that call into question other environmental
statutes' sovereign immunity waiver provisions, specifically the Clean
Water Act (CWA),' 6 the Clean Air Act (CAA), 7 and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).18
The Ohio rationale undercuts the effectiveness of those laws by questioning
their ability to waive sovereign immunity and subject the federal govern-
ment to certain enforcement tools.' 9 The FFCA, which amended the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),20 does not address
Ohio's possible effect on the CAA or the CERCLA.
The civil penalties issue, however, is only half the problem. Part III
next examines the constitutional issues the FFCA raises. The constitutional
the Department of Energy for example-into complying with the requirements of federal
environmental laws?
13. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992); see infra notes 106-21 (discussing and analyzing Ohio decision).
The Ohio decision overturned an appeals court decision by the same name. Unless otherwise
specifically noted, a reference to "Ohio" herein is to the United States Supreme Court decision.
14. Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992)
[hereinafter FFCA]; see infra notes 128-44 (discussing provisions of FFCA).
15. The Ohio decision was preceded by a split in the circuits over the issue of punitive
civil penalties. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (defining punitive civil penalties);
infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text (discussing appeals court split over punitive civil
penalties issue).
16. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7661f (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
18. Id. §§ 9601-9662.
19. See infra notes 150-70 and accompanying text (discussing impact of Ohio on CAA
and CERCLA waivers).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
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questions arise from the EPA's attempts to enforce the RCRA against
federal facilities. Under the FFCA, the EPA could issue administrative
orders to other agencies or, arguably, institute civil actions against other
agencies. Part III will show that administrative orders are constitutional
under the FFCA and that the FFCA does not authorize civil actions, thus
avoiding constitutional problems.
Finally, this Note will conclude that both congressional and executive
action is needed to repair the key flaw of the FFCA, namely, its limited
scope. Congress should extend the clear and unambiguous immunity waiver
in the FFCA to other environmental statutes. The President should use
the power of the executive office to control EPA enforcement against
other federal agencies. The justification for congressional and presidential
action begins with an understanding of the extent of the pollution problem
at federal facilities.
I. THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION
A. The Scope of the Pollution Problem at Federal Facilities
The term "federal facility"'can include anything from a Navy ship to
buildings, installations, or land.2' Of 27,000 total federal installations,
roughly 5,000 have requested funding for environmental pollution abate-
ment projects or hold environmental permits. 22 The number of federal
facilities listed on the EPA's Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance
Docket is increasing. In just six months, from August 1992 to February
1993, the number of facilities on the list increased from 1709 to 1930.23
While federal pollution is concentrated at facilities owned or operated
by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy
(DOE), 24 it is by no means limited to those two agencies. The Departments
of Interior and Agriculture own substantial acres of potentially contimi-
21. See NATIONAL GovERNORs Ass'N & NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATToRNEYs GENERAL, FROM
CRISIS TO COMMITMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AND COMPLIANCE AT FEDERAL FACILITIES 2
(1990) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S REP.] (revealing that uses of "federal facility" varied).
22. Id.; see infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (explaining CWA and RCRA permit
systems).
23. Compare 58 Fed. Reg. 7298, 7300 (1993) (showing 1930 sites on docket in February
1993) with 57 Fed. Reg. 31,758, 31,760 (1992) (showing 1709 sites on docket in July 1992).
Congress mandated the Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket (Docket) in the
1986 Superfund reauthorization legislation. It is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9620(c) (1988). The
Docket serves to "identify the universe of [flederal facilities that must be evaluated to determine
whether they pose a risk to human health and the environment .... " 57 Fed. Reg. at 31,758.
Thus, a listing on the Docket does not signify actual contamination, but rather suspected
contamination and reason for concern. The National Priorities List (NPL) identifies actually
contaminated sites, and 116 federal facilities are on the NPL. H.R. RP. No. 111, supra note
2, at 3, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1289.
24. See Babich, supra note 6, at 28 (stating that DOD and DOE have been poor stewards
of public resources).
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nated land.25 Activities that have contributed to the contamination include
mining, 26 cattle grazing, timber cutting, and other licensed activities.
27
The DOD and the DOE sites, however, present the most toxic, most
dangerous, and most expensive threat to the environment. The responsible
agency may never remedy many of the sites because they are so contam-
inated. 2 Nor has the waste stopped flowing. The DOD and the DOE
together annually generate approximately twenty million tons of hazardous
or mixed hazardous and radioactive waste.29 While the DOD has improved
its record by emphasizing waste reduction techniques,3 0 the waste already
fouling the environment remains unaddressed.
The waste is largely a legacy of the Cold War. Nuclear weapons
production at the DOE plants created much of the waste.3 The pollution
at the DOD facilities includes unexploded munitions, contamination from
chemical weapons, and spilled fuel.12 At the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in
Denver, Colorado, for instance, the disposal of wastes from the manu-
facture of chemical weapons has contributed to groundwater contamina-
tion.3
25. See id. at 28 (stating that Departments of Interior and Agriculture "own vast amounts
of potentially contaminated property (e.g., abandoned mining sites)").
26. Id. See generally Nancy Mangone, The Other Federal PRPS: Liability for Mining
Wastes Under CERCLA and RCRA, 10 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 87 (1990) (discussing whether EPA
can and should seek CERCLA response costs or corrective actions from other executive branch
departments).
27. See Wolverton, supra note 6, at 567 (discussing pollution problems on federal lands
and citing sources).
28. Cleanup at Federal Facilities: Hearings on H.R. 765 Before the Subcomm. on
Transportation and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1989) (statement of Charles A. Bowsher, United States Comptroller General).
29. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 2, at 2, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1288; see
Federal Facilities Compliance: Hearings on H.R. 2194 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation
and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 69 (1991) (statement of Christian R. Holmes, Deputy Assistant Administrator, EPA)
[hereinafter Federal Facilities Compliance] (defining mixed waste as "wastes that contain
hazardous wastes subject to RCRA regulations and radioactive wastes subject to the Atomic
Energy Act").
30. See David Hanson, Defense Pollution Reduction Efforts Paying Off, CanMIcAL &
ENGINEERING NEws, Sept. 21, 1992, at 15 (revealing that total DOD hazardous waste output
fell 57% from 1987 to 160 million pounds per year).
31. See OFFcE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CoMPLEx CLEANUP: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION (SuimARY) 3-4 (Feb. 1991) reprinted in Department
of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY 1992 and 1993: Hearings on S. 1507 Before
the Senate Armed Services Comm., 102d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 7, 285, 294-95 (1991) (identifying
as one cause of current waste problems "a long history of emphasizing the urgency of weapons
production in the interest of national security, to the neglect of environmental considerations");
Dan W. Reicher & S. Jacob Scherr, The Bomb Factories: Out of Compliance and Out of
Control, in HIDDEN DANGERS: ENVmONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREPARING FOR WAR 35, 35
(Anne H. Ehrlich & John W. Birks eds., 1990) (describing environmental problems caused by
DOE's nuclear weapons production).
32. Cleaning Up Closing Bases Will Cost More, Take Longer Than Estimated, CBO
Predicts, [Current Dev.] 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1385, 1385 (Sept. 11, 1992).
33. GOVERNOR'S REP., supra note 21, at 11.
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The costs of cleanup are overwhelming. Estimates of the total cost of
cleanup exceed $150 billion over the next twenty to thirty years.3 4 The
DOD has estimated its cleanup costs at $24 billion over the next ten
years.35 The DOD requested $3.7 billion for fiscal year 1993 to pay for
environmental cleanups and compliance at its military facilities. 36 The
DOE, for its part, requested $5.5 billion for fiscal year 1993. 37 The House
of Representatives increased total funding allotted for environmental cleanup
and waste management at the DOE to $4.6 billion for the same period. 38
Federal facility pollution is a serious problem. The major actors on
the issue-Congress, the EPA, and other federal agencies-are moving
towards a resolution by increasing funding levels for environmental
cleanup.39 Congress's response, however, has been slow. 40 Faced with
agency noncompliance in the interim, state regulators41 took appropriate
enforcement action under then-existing environmental laws. The ensuing
clash between the regulators and the regulated created a legal framework
that stymied effective enforcement efforts.
B. An Introduction to the Legal Framework for Enforcing
Environmental Laws Against Federal Facilities
State regulators worked primarily with two laws in attempting to
address federal pollution: the CWA and the RCRA. The CWA authorizes
the EPA to establish national standards for water quality.42 To enforce
these standards, the CWA establishes the National Pollutant Discharge
34. See id. at 3 (suggesting clean-up cost range of $95 billion to $135 billion for DOE
facilities and $10 billion to $15 billion for DOD facilities). More recent reports place the cleanup
costs at DOE facilities at $600 billion. New Public Participation Planning Teams at Core of
DOE Cleanup Efforts, Official Says, [Current Dev.] 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3049, 3049 (Mar.
26, 1993).
35. U.S. GENERAL AccotrNrno OFFICE, HAZARDoUS WASTE: DOD ESTIMATES FOR CLEAN-
ING UP CONTAMINATED SITES INPROVED Bur STILL CONSTRAINED 3 (Oct. 1991) (GAO/NSIAD
92-37) [hereinafter HAzARDOUS WASTE]; Senate Panel Urged to Support More Funding for
Defense Department Environment Programs, [Current Dev.] 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 316, 316
(May 15, 1992).
36. Senate Panel Urged to Support Funding, supra note 35, at 316. President Bush signed,
on September 23, 1992, a supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 5620) that "contain[ed] $1
billion in new money for environmental cleanup and compliance at military bases." Bush Signs
into Law Appropriations Bill with $1 Billion for DOD Environmental Efforts, [Current Dev.]
23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1501, 1501 (Oct. 2, 1992).
37. Interagency Report on DOE Cleanup Costs Rebutted, Questioned by Environmental-
ists, [Current Dev.] 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 279, 279 (May 8, 1992). Environmental groups dispute
that the amount allotted for cleanup and waste management is enough to cover all of the
DOE's compliance agreement obligations. Id.
38. House Approves $1 Billion Funding Increase for Weapons Plant Cleanups, [Current
Dev.] 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 669, 669-70 (June 19, 1992).
39. See Hanson, supra note 30, at 15 (stating that fiscal 1993 funding request is four
times that of 1987). See generally Cleaning Up Federal Facilities: Controversy over an Environ-
mental Peace Dividend, [Current Dev.] 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2659, 2659 (Feb. 5, 1993) (providing
general overview of problems facing cleanup efforts at DOE and DOD installations).
40. See infra note 123 (discussing FFCA's extensive legislative history).
41. See infra note 62 (discussing how EPA enforcement authority was limited).
42. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314, 1316-1317 (1988).
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Elimination System (NPDES). 43 The NPDES authorizes the EPA to issue
permits allowing the discharge of specified levels of pollutants." Further-
more, states interested in enforcing the national standards may submit
plans to the EPA for approval.4 5 Essentially, the aim of the CWA is to
combat ongoing pollution.
Conversely, Congress designed the RCRA to address problems asso-
ciated with existing hazardous waste. Specifically, the RCRA deals with
hazardous waste tracking and disposal problems. 46 Congress passed the
legislation to establish a "cradle-to-grave" 47 monitoring system for haz-
ardous waste. Like the CWA, the RCRA allows individual states that seek
to administer and enforce a hazardous waste program pursuant to the
RCRA standards to submit their programs to the EPA for approval. 4
The CWA's and the RCRA's enforcement mechanisms are similar. If
the EPA or a relevant state enforcement body finds a personin violation
of the statute, it can issue an administrative order requiring compliance
by a certain date. 49 Both statutes allow proceedings in federal district court
to obtain compliance with statutory requirements or to seek civil peial-
ties. 50 The statutes allow courts to impose criminal penalties.', Finally,
individuals may bring citizen's suits against the EPA or polluting entities. 52
43. Id. § 1342. See generally 2 WnIL.AM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 4.26-
.32 (1986) (discussing NPDES).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1988). See generally Corinne Beckwith Yates, Note, Limitations
of Sovereign Immunity Under the Clean Water Act: Empowering States to Confront Federal
Polluters, 90 MICH. L. REv. 183, 189-92 (1991) (providing analysis of NPDES).
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1988). Once the EPA approves a state program, active federal
enforcement within that state ceases. Id. § 1342(c). However, should the EPA determine that
the state is not administering its program properly, the EPA can resume responsibility for
enforcement. Id. § 1342(c)(3). See Yates, supra note 44, at 192-93 (discussing state-operated
NPDES permitting).
46. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6923-6925 (1988) (establishing standards and permitting system for
hazardous waste handling); 3 RODGERS, supra note 43, §§ 7.1-.5 (discussing RCRA in detail);
Milsten, supra note 6, at 126-27 (discussing how RCRA functions).
47. Jom QuARLEs, FEDERAL REGULATION OF HAZARDOuS WASTES: A GUIDE TO RCRA 5
(1982).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988). Like the CWA, the RCRA allows federal takeover should
the EPA determine that the state is not properly administering the program approved by the
EPA. Id. § 6926(e).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1988). Generally, an administrative
order is the whole or part of a final disposition by an agency in an adjudicatory or licensing
matter. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1988). The RCRA allows the target of an administrative order the
opportunity for a public hearing prior to the order being finalized. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(b) (1988).
An example of an administrative order under the RCRA is set out in Environmental Compliance
by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 485-89 (1987) [hereinafter
Environmental Compliance].
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1) (1988).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988); see Rothmel, supra note 8,
at 585-86 (discussing enforcement mechanisms in CAA, CWA, and RCRA).
52. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988) (RCRA). A citizen
suit is a cause of action, authorized by an explicit statutory grant of authority, pursued by a
1993]
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The CWA and the RCRA also contain sections that seek to waive
sovereign immunity and to make federal facilities subject to their provi-
sions. Both the CWA and the RCRA require federal facilities to comply
with, inter alia, "all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements."
3
Subsequent litigation, however, exposed uncertainties over the scope of
these sovereign immunity waivers. 54 Slowly, court resolution or agency
stipulation settled many issues. Several years of litigation ultimately led
to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ohio and to the FFCA.
Therefore, examining how various issues developed will lead to a greater
understanding of what exactly was at stake when Congress considered the
FFCA.
Courts had no trouble determining that substantive standards contained
in federal environmental laws applied to federal facilities.." Controversy
arose, however, over how regulators would enforce those standards against
government polluters. Courts consistently have applied a substance versus
procedure distinction to the federal facility statutory provisions. 6 Courts
have held that the reference to "requirements" in the CWA and the RCRA
included items such as waste disposal standards, permits, and reporting
duties, but excluded any means of enforcement.5 7 This judicially developed
distinction created a chasm between those mechanisms available for use
private individual or organization to enforce statutory requirements. See William H. Timbers
& David A. Wirth, Private Rights of Action and Judicial Review in Federal Environmental
Law, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 403, 405-06 (1985) (discussing citizen's suits).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988).
54. See infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text (discussing court of appeals decisions).
55. See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 181 (1976) (agreeing that substantive standards
apply to federal facilities); United States v. Washington, 872 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1989)
(same); California v. Walters, 751 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); see also Colleen Kraft
Shields, Casenote, The Federal Government: Finally Paying Its Environmental Dues: State of
Ohio v. United States Department of Energy, 2 VmL. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 449 (1991) (discussing
Washington). But see Kenneth M. Murchison, Reforming Environmental Enforcement: Lessons
from Twenty Years of Waiving Federal Immunity to State Regulation, 11 VA. ENVm. L.J. 179,
192-95 (1991-1992) (discussing cases where courts held "requirements" to exclude certain state
environmental laws). State laws passed independently of federal laws such as the RCRA, the
CERCLA and the CWA and state laws that are implemented pursuant to the RCRA, the
CERCLA and the CWA should be distinguished. Murchison addresses the former. This note
addresses the latter. Congress designed federal environmental laws to establish minimum stan-
dards and to allow the states to then adopt those standards and enforce them on their own.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988); Milsten, supra note 6, at 124 & 127; Charles W. Tucker,
Compliance by Federal Facilities with State and Local Environmental Regulations, 35 NAVAL
L. REV. 87, 97 (1986) (stating that "requirements" applies to regulations under CWA, RCRA,
and CERCLA, but not to state liability laws).
56. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1636-37 (1992) (distin-
guishing coercive from punitive sanctions); Hancock, 426 U.S. at 183 (distinguishing standards
from means to enforce standards); Walters, 751 F.2d at 978 (same); Federal Facility Compliance
Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 1140 Before Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1990) (statement of Jack Van Kley, Office of Ohio's Attorney
General) (discussing Hancock decision).
57. Walters, 751 F.2d at 978.
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against private polluters and those available for use against federal pol-
luters.
The substance-procedure distinction limited state and federal enforce-
ment efforts. Declaratory and injunctive relief, for example, did not lose
effectiveness as a result. The federal government specifically conceded that
such relief was available against a polluting facility." However, the sub-
stance-procedure distinction did restrict state administrative order author-
ity.59 Consequently, states expended valuable resources on ineffective
enforcement options 0 rather than using the more rapid and flexible mech-
anism of administrative orders. 61 Furthermore, statutory and constitutional
concerns prior to the FFCA also limited administrative order authority
exercised by the federal government. 62 The FFCA has bolstered a state's
authority to use administrative orders. 63
The substance-procedure distinction also affected citizen's suits. The
RCRA and the CWA clearly authorize citizen's suits against the United
States.6 The uncertainty concerned what enforcement mechanisms were
58. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1635 n.15 (conceding availability, via citizen's suit and direct
state action, of coercive sanctions against United States for violation of court orders); see also
Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Hodel, 586 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (E.D. Tenn. 1984)
(applying substantive standards and ordering declaratory relief but refusing injunctive relief due
to national security concerns); Susan L. Smith, Shields for the King's Men: Official Immunity
and Other Obstacles to Effective Prosecution of Federal Officials for Environmental Crimes,
16 CoLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 16 n.47 (1991) (discussing three stages of federal resistance to state
laws); Cheng, supra note 10, at 846 (discussing DOE resistance to state laws). For a discussion
of the constitutional issues surrounding the use of injunctive relief against the federal government,
see Michael D. Axline, Constitutional Implications of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies
in Environmental Cases, 12 HARv. ENvmT. L. REv. 1 (1988).
59. See H.R. RaP. No. 111, supra note 2, at 11-12, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1297-98 (stating that states need administrative order authority to avoid unnecessary and wasteful
litigation thus implying that lack of such authority existed); Federal Facilities Compliance, supra
note 29, at 39 (same); 138 CoNo. Rzc. S14,756 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Baucus) (stating that FFCA clarifies availability of administrative orders against federal facilities).
60. See Federal Facilities Compliance, supra note 29, at 58 (statement of Mary A. Gade,
Director, Illinois EPA) (discussing inefficiencies and time delays in current system requiring
extensive litigation of technical, legal issues).
61. See Federal Facilities Compliance, supra note 29, at 57-58 (statement of Christine 0.
Gregoire, Washington Department of Ecology) (implying administrative order authority better
enforcement option). States use administrative order authority against private polluters. Id. at
58 (statement of Thomas P. Looby, Colorado Department of Health).
62. See infra notes 195-208 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional issues raised
by administrative order authority). Department of Justice (DOJ) concerns over the constitution-
ality of the EPA's use of administrative orders against federal agencies prompted the development
of an informal dispute resolution process. See Environmental Compliance, supra note 49, at
211-12 (statement of F. Henry Habicht II, DOJ) (arguing that resolution process avoids
constitutional problems); id. at 201 (describing details of resolution process). Many saw the
informal process weakening the EPA's authority. See H.R. REP. No. 141, supra note 5, at 43
(characterizing informal dispute ,resolution process as involving ineffective "jawboning" at
elevated bureaucratic levels).
63. See infra notes 128-44 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of FFCA).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (1988) (RCRA provision); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1988)
(CWA provision).
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available in a citizen suit. Declaratory and injunctive relief always had
been available to those bringing a citizen's suit against the United States.
61
Civil penalties were available via the citizen suit mechanism when the
object of that suit was a private polluter. 66 However, authority was divided
as to whether states could use citizen's suits to obtain civil penalties against
the United States. 67 The Supreme Court in Ohio held that a state could
not use a citizen's suit to obtain civil penalties against the United States.
61
The FFCA waiver of sovereign immunity decreased the significance of
using a citizen's suit to seek civil penalties against the United States.
69
The substarnce-procedure distinction also affected the availability of
criminal penalties against federal employees. The CWA and the RCRA
make criminal sanctions available against private polluters, and the gov-
ernment uses them.70 However, the availability of criminal penalties, that
is, a prosecution of a federal employee by a state or federal authority for
environmental crimes, was not entirely clear prior to the FFCA's passage. 71
65. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Hodel, 586 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (E.D. Tenn.
1984) (using citizen suit to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against United States).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (RCRA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (CWA).
67. Compare Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 765 (S.D. Ohio
1988) (holding that RCRA citizen suit provision allows recovery of civil penalties), affd on
other grounds, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992) and Milsten, supra
note 6, at 142 (same) and Smith, supra note 11, at 56 (same) with McClellan Ecological Seepage
Situation (MESS) v. Weinburger, 655 F. Supp. 601, 603 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that RCRA
citizen suit provision does not allow recovery of civil penalties) and Gleason & Goutzounis,
supra note 6, at 297-98, 304 (same). Civil penalties continue to be available against private
polluters.
Commentators suggested using citizen suit provisions as an alternative to a direct suit of
the federal government. See Milsten, supra note 6, at 142 (arguing that alternative approach is
to use citizen suit provisions). The state would sue as a citizen, rather than as a sovereign.
Michael Donnelly & James G. Van Ness, The Warrior and the Druid-The DOD and Environ-
mental Law, 33 FED. B. NEWS & J. 37, 39 (1986). The drawback is that any penalties collected
in a citizens suit do not necessarily go to the citizen that brought the suit. See Theodore L.
Garret, Citizen Suits, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 68, 80 (Janet S. Kole & Larry D. Espel
eds., 1991) (discussing limitations on citizen suit recoveries in CWA and CAA). But see Elizabeth
R. Thagard, Note, The Rule that Clean Water Act Civil Penalties Must Go to the Treasury
and How to Avoid It, 16 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 507, 530-33 (1992) (discussing circumvention
of rule).
68. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1634-35.
69. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (discussing FFCA provisions).
70. See Civil and Criminal Enforcement Accomplishments, [News & Analysis] 22 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,150, 10,150 (Feb. 1992) (revealing total of 550 months imprisonment
and $14.1 million in fines resulting from EPA criminal enforcement in FY 1991); supra note 7
(discussing Ashland Oil and imposition of criminal penalty).
71. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (discussing effectiveness of FFCA in
addressing preexisting concerns on criminal liability waivers). See generally James P. Calve,
Environmental Crimes: Upping the Ante for Noncompliance with Environmental Laws, 133
Mu.. L. REv. 279 (1991) (discussing criminal liability of federal employees); H. Allen Irish,
Enforcement of State Environmental Crimes on the Federal Enclave, 133 Mm.. L. REV. 249
(1991) (same); Smith, supra note 58 (same); James B. Doyle, Note, "Who Will Watch the
Watcher?": Using Independent Counsel to Compel Federal Facilities to Comply with Federal
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Federal prosecutors have conducted the only successful prosecutions.
2
Finally, the substance-procedure distinction affected the ability to
assess civil penalties against federal polluters for past violations. 71 Ohio
made a vital distinction between civil penalties that are coercive and those
that are punitive.7 4 A court imposes a coercive penalty to induce compliance
with previously issued orders or injunctions.7 On the other hand, a court
imposes a punitive penalty to punish past violations of environmental
laws.
76
The federal government admitted liability for coercive civil penalties
prior to the FFCA .7  The issue confronting courts and commentators,
therefore, was whether federal agencies were liable for punitive civil
penalties under various environmental statutes. Courts continued to apply
the substance-procedure distinction to punitive civil penalties and therefore
did not allow imposition of such penalties.7 8 Many comnlentators thought
that those courts were incorrect and that the federal statutes involved-
mainly the RCRA and the CWA-had waived sovereign immunity for
punitive civil penalties.7 9 The Supreme Court in Ohio, however, agreed
with those courts applying the substance-procedure distinction.
8 0
Out of this background came the three issues that the FFCA had to
address: state and federal administrative order authority, punitive civil
penalties, and criminal sanctions. The Ohio decision, and the cases leading
up to it, focused only on civil penalties. 8' The Ohio decision, while not
the primary impetus for adopting the FFCA, further defined the required
congressional action.
Environmental Laws, 26 VAL. U. L. Rnv. 671 (1992) (same). The FFCA has addressed most
of these problems. FFCA, supra note 14, § 102(a)(4), 106 Stat. at 1505-06.
72. See United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 743 (4th Cir. 1990) (upholding criminal
conviction under RCRA), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991); United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d
1550, 1551 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding criminal conviction under CERCLA without addressing
immunity); California v. Walters, 751 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (precluding
state prosecution for RCRA violations).
73. See, e.g., Lotz, supra note 6, at 14-24 (discussing civil penalties issue); Milsten, supra
note 6, at 131-37 (same); Wolverton, supra note 6, at 577-85 (same).
74. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1632 (1992) (distinguishing
punitive from coercive fines).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1635 & n.15.
78. See Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1295 (10th Cir. 1990)
(applying substance-procedure distinction to civil penalties issue); California v. Walters, 751
F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).
79. See, e.g., Milsten, supra note 6, at 143 (concluding that explicit waiver exists in
RCRA); Rothmel, supra note 8, at 621 (same); Yates, supra note 44, at 206 (same for CWA).
80. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1631 (1992); see infra notes
108-21 and accompanying text (summarizing Ohio).
81. See infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text (discussing appeals court cases preceding
Ohio).
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL FACILITY COMPLIANCE
A. Ohio v. United States Department of Energy
The Supreme Court decided Ohio amidst a shrill debate over the scope
of the immunity waiver in the RCRA and the CWA.82 As to the RCRA,
all courts of appeal unanimously agreed that the RCRA federal facilities
provision did not waive sovereign immunity. 83 Two district courts, prior
to reversal, as well as numerous commentators, disagreed.8 4 The appeals
courts' unanimity, however, did not extend to their final holdings because
the scope of their opinions differed. Some courts looked beyond the
RCRA federal facility provision to a similar provision in the CWA and
to the citizen suit provisions of both the RCRA and the CWA.
1. The Setting in the Circuits Prior to Ohio
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Mitzelfelt
v. Department of Air Force" limited its inquiry to the federal facility
provision. In Mitzelfelt, the Tenth Circuit held that the waiver section in
the RCRA did not effect a clear waiver of sovereign immunity for New
Mexico's penalty claim.8 6 The court stressed that any sovereign immunity
waiver must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign.87 In this case,
the court reasoned that the language in section. 6001 of the RCRA,
subjecting federal agencies to "all federal, state, interstate, and local
requirements, both substantive and procedural,''88 did not unambiguously
82. See Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1294 (10th Cir. 1990)
(citing courts and commentators that had split on immunity waiver's scope); supra note 79
(listing authors concluding that RCRA contained waiver). But cf. Gleason & Goutzounis, supra
note 6, at 308 (concluding that "proper interpretation" of RCRA and CWA does not include
waiver).
83. See infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text (discussing court of appeals holdings
on RCRA immunity waiver provision).
84. See Maine v. Department of Navy, 702 F. Supp. 322, 330 (D. Me. 1988) (holding
that RCRA waives sovereign immunity in federal facilities provision), rev'd, 973 F.2d 1007 (1st
Cir. 1992); Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 765 (S.D. Ohio 1988)
(same), aff'd on other grounds, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992);
Milsten, supra note 6, at 143 (same). See generally Margaret N. Strand & Stephen L. Samuels,
Federal Facilities' Liability for Civil Penalties Under RCRA and the Clean Water Act, 2 FED.
FACILITIES ENvTL. J. 307 (1991) (giving general overview of status of case law prior to Ohio
decision).
85. 903 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1990).
86. Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1296 (10th Cir. 1990). Mitzelfelt
arose when New Mexico notified the Air Force that Cannon Air Force Base was violating state
hazardous waste laws. Id. at 1294. The Air Force corrected all but one violation. Id. New
Mexico then ordered the Air Force to correct the violation and to pay a $5,000 civil penalty.
Id. While the Air Force did correct the violation, it did not pay the penalty arguing that
sovereign immunity protected it from such a penalty. Id.
87. Id. at 1295.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988) (emphasis added).
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waive federal sovereign immunity from civil penalties.89 The court rejected
the argument that Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity because
it enacted section 6001 in response to prior Supreme Court decisions.
Those Supreme Court decisions held that the word "requirements" in the
CAA and the CWA did not include state permit requirements." According
to the Tenth Circuit, the generality of the legislative history rendered it
unhelpful in defining "requirements." 91
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached the
same conclusion in United States v. Washington.92 In Washington, the
Ninth Circuit held that section 6001 of the RCRA was not an express
waiver of sovereign immunity from a state's assessment of civil penalties. 93
This case arose out of Washington's attempt to administratively assess a
$49,000 penalty against the DOE's Hanford Reservation facility. The Ninth
Circuit rejected arguments essentially similar to those made by the state
in Mitzelfelt and used similar reasoning.94
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, prior to
reversal by the Supreme Court in the same case, went beyond the RCRA
federal facility provision. In Ohio v. United States Department of Energy,9
Ohio sued the DOE in federal district court for violations of the CWA
and the RCRA that arose from the operation of the DOE's Fernald, Ohio,
uranium-processing plant. 96 In addition to seeking injunctive relief against
the DOE, the state sought penalties under both state and federal law for
past violations of the CWA and the RCRA.97 Prior to the district court's
resolution of the DOE's motion to dismiss, the DOE and Ohio entered a
consent decree. The parties agreed to settle or stay all substantive claims
addressing actual compliance or remediation in return for Ohio's dropping
89. Id.
90. See EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 227
(1976) (holding that language of CWA did not waive sovereign immunity); Hancock v. Train,
426 U.S. 167, 198 (1976) (same, with regard to CAA).
91. Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air Force, 903 F.2d 293, 1295 (10th Cir. 1990).
92. 872 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1989).
93. United States v. Washington, 872 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1989). The Washington
court addressed three arguments advanced by the state. First, the state argued that the plain
language of 42 U.S.C. § 6961 contained a sweeping waiver of sovereign immunity. Washington,
872 F.2d at 876. The court, citing the rule of interpretation requiring waivers to be unequivocal,
noted that the only unequivocal waiver in § 6961 was to substantive standards and court-ordered
sanctions, not to civil penalties. Id. at 877. The state's second argument was that Congress's
reaction to the Hancock decision in the CAA indicated an intent to waive sovereign immunity
in the RCRA. Id. at 876. The court rejected this argument. The RCRA's legislative history and
statutory language were both silent as to punitive civil penalties. Id. at 878-79. Finally, the state
argued that the court should reverse a prior decision of the Ninth Circuit regarding the term
"requirements" in § 6961. Id. at 876. The court refused to do so noting that the authority of
one panel to reverse a prior panel decision is limited. Id. at 880.
94. See id. at 876-80 (listing and then rejecting Washington's legal arguments).
95. 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
96. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1632 (1992).
97. Id.
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its claim to all forms of relief except the penalties for past violations. 9s
In this posture, the case squarely presented the issue of whether Congress
had waived sovereign immunity for civil fines imposed for past failure to
comply with both the CWA and the RCRA.
The Sixth Circuit held in Ohio that the state could obtain civil penalties
from the federal agency. 99 As to the RCRA, the Sixth Circuit agreed that
the federal facilities provision of section 6001 did not waive sovereign
immunity. Instead, the court looked to the citizen's suit provision of the
RCRA to discover a clear sovereign immunity waiver.'0° The court noted
that Congress included the United States as a "person" in the citizen's
suit provision of the RCRA but not in the civil penalties provision of the
RCRA.'0 ' Thus, the court held that the citizen's suit provision incorporated
the civil penalties provision, not vice versa, and consequently, the citizen
suit provision's definition of "person" applied. 02 Additionally, the court
found that Congress intended to subject the United States to civil penalties
in the context of citizen's suit. 03 The combination of these factors allowed
the Sixth Circuit to conclude that Ohio could seek civil penalties against
the United States under the citizen suit section of the RCRA.104 The Sixth
Circuit also concluded that the CWA federal facilities provision waived
immunity. 05
2. The Supreme Court's Ohio Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ohio, analyzed the four
possible statutory provisions in which the government might have waived
its immunity, and firmly rejected them all. The four provisions advanced
and rejected included the citizen's suit provisions of the CWA and the
RCRA' °6 and the federal facilities provisions of the CWA and the RCRA. 0 7
Starting with the proposition that waivers of immunity must be con-
strued strictly in favor of the sovereign, 10 the Court proceeded to examine
exclusively the statutory language of the provisions. Treating the CWA
and the RCRA citizen's suit provisions together, the Court rejected Ohio's
98. Id.
99. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1990).
100. Id. at 1064. The Washington court did not address the argument relating to the citizen
suit section. Id. at 1064 n.2.
101. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (1988) (including United States as person) with id. §
6903(15) (excluding United States in general definition of person).
102. Ohio, 904 F.2d at 1065.
103. Id. at 1064.
104. Id. at 1065.
105. See id. at 1060-62 (arguing that use of term "sanction" coupled with "arising under
federal law" terminology expresses clear sovereign immunity waiver); cf. California v. Depart-
ment of Navy, 845 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1988) (determining no sovereign immunity waiver
exists in CWA).
106. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988) (RCRA).
107. See 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988) (RCRA).
108. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (1992).
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argument, successful before the court of appeals, that the provisions
support assessment of civil penalties against a federal agency. The Court
reasoned that whenever one provision of a statute incorporates another
provision of the same statute, it incorporates the restrictions inherent in
the incorporated provision.' 9 The Court's holding is the exact opposite
of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning." 0 Here, the incorporated provision is the
civil penalties section of the RCRA. That section does not apply to the
United States because the United States is not a "person" in the general
definitions section. Therefore, when a court incorporates the civil penalty
section into the citizen suit provision, the citizen's suit provision is limited
by the civil penalty section's lack of applicability to the United States. M
The Court then turned to the CWA federal facilities provision. Two
relevant portions of the CWA are in question. The first provides that
"[each department, agency, or instrumentality of the ... Federal Gov-
ernment ... shall be subject to, and comply with, all [flederal, [s]tate,
interstate, and local ... process and sanctions .... 11,2 As to this pro-
vision, Ohio argued that the term "sanctions" included punitive civil
penalties. The Court rejected this argument. Because the definition of
"sanction" was broad enough to include both coercive fines and punitive
fines, the exact meaning was not clear as required for a sovereign immunity
waiver. " To determine the meaning intended by Congress the Court looked
to the context of the term's use. The Court noted that Congress included
"sanctions" in the phrase "process and sanctions" whenever "sanctions"
was used in the statute. This usage created a fundamental distinction
between substantive requirements and judicial process to enforce those
requirements." 4 The fact that the statute refers to "process and sanctions"
being "enforced" in federal, state, or local court supports the key dis-
tinction."-' The Court employed the distinction to argue that it is logical
to infer that Congress used "sanctions" in its coercive, and not punitive,
sense.
The second provision, occurring after the first in the statute, provides
that "the United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising
under federal law or imposed by a state or local court to enforce an order
or process of such court.""' 6 As to this provision, Ohio contended that
Congress included a waiver for punitive fines by using the "arising under
federal law" language quoted above." 7 Again, the Court looked to context.
109. Id. at 1634.
110. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit holding on
incorporation of civil penalties provision into citizen's suit provision).
111. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1634-35.
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
113. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1636-37 (1992).
114. Id. at 1636.
115. Id. at 1637.
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
117. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1636.
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While the sentence relied upon by Ohio did refer more specifically to
"civil penalties" and not "sanctions," the Court noted that the sentence
was phrased to limit or clarify the preceding waiver. Even though the
language did pull towards Ohio's interpretation, the Court observed that
adopting Ohio's interpretation would create a new problem of finding a
source of authority for levying civil penalties against the federal govern-
ment. The Court did not accept that the civil penalties provision of the
CWA, authorizing civil penalties against "persons," could serve as the
source of authority, because "persons" did not include the United States.
The Court refused to find a new source of authority, reminding Ohio that
any waiver must be clear and unequivocal. 
8
Finally, the Ohio Court turned to the federal facilities provision of
the RCRA. The Court agreed unanimously that the RCRA had not waived
sovereign immunity for punitive civil penalties." 9 Ohio had argued that
the language "all ... requirements" constituted an explicit and unambig-
uous waiver of sovereign immunity. 120 The Court adopted the Tenth
Circuit's position in Mitzelfelt construing this language as "including
substantive standards and the means for implementing those standards,
but excluding punitive measures.''2
The Supreme Court's decision in Ohio indicated that if Congress
wanted the government held liable for civil penalties, it would have to
act.122 On September 23, 1992, Congress passed the FFCA.123 President
118. Id. at 1638-39.
119. See id. at 1631 (reporting unanimous opinion with respect to Part II.C interpreting
RCRA federal facilities provision).
120. Id. at 1639.
121. Id. at 1639-40; Mitzelfelt v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1295
(10th Cir. 1990).
122. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1639 (1988) (expressing
uncertainty over meaning of RCRA and CWA language). The Court in Ohio all but invited
Congress to make the RCRA waiver more clear:
The question is still what Congress could have meant in using a seemingly expansive
phrase like "civil penalties arising under federal law." Perhaps it used it just in case
some later amendment might waive the government's immunity from punitive sanc-
tions. Perhaps a drafter mistakenly thought that liability for such sanctions had
somehow been waived already. Perhaps someone was careless. The question has no
satisfactory answer.
Id.
123. FFCA, supra note 14. The FFCA took a number of years to develop. See 138 CONG.
REc. H9136 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1992) (statement of Rep. Swift) (stating length of time needed
to obtain final passage of FFCA). In the 100th Congress, supporters introduced the FFCA as
H.R. 3785 and held two days of hearings in 1988. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 2, at 18,
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1304. The Energy and Commerce Committee reported H.R.
3785 favorably, but it went no further. 138 CoNo. REc. at H9136. Supporters again introduced
the FFCA as H.R. 1056 in the 102d Congress. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 2, at 18,
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1304. The legislation finally passed the full House. Id.
While the legislation's primary purpose is to address the sovereign immunity issue, that is
not its sole purpose. Some examples of additional provisions include provisions relating to:
inspection of federal facilities by states at the facility's expense, FFCA, supra note 14, § 104,
106 Stat. at 1507, and additional requirements relating to mixed wastes at federal facilities.
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Bush signed the legislation on October 6, 1992.124 The FFCA filled what
legislators saw as an important need: correcting the allegedly improper
reading of the RCRA's waiver section by courts of appeal and the Supreme
Court. 1
25
B. The Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992
Congress .did not immediately enact the FFCA even though Congress
believed that the reading courts had applied to the RCRA was incorrect.
Congress held the first hearings on federal facility compliance in late
1987.126 When Congress finally passed the FFCA in 1992, it enacted a
statute with provisions aimed at overturning the Ohio decision and pro-
viding the clear and unequivocal waiver that the Supreme Court required. 2 7
First, the FFCA subjects federal agencies to civil penalties, both
punitive and coercive. 12 The language Congress used meets the standard
124. Statement on Signing Legislation Waiving Federal Immunity Relating to Solid and
Hazardous Waste, 28 WEEKLY Comp. PRas. Doc. 1868 (Oct. 12, 1992).
125. See H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1291
(disapproving of lower court decisions).
126. See generally Environmental Compliance, supra note 49 (dating hearings in 1987).
The battle lines at the congressional hearings were well-drawn. On one side were state officials
that were encountering difficulty in enforcing their laws on federal facilities. They were joined
by environmentalists. See Federal Facilities Compliance, supra note 29, at ill (listing persons
giving testimony). On the other side were the polluting federal agencies. Id. To the extent there
was a middle ground, the DOJ attempted to occupy it. The DOJ took the position that it was
possible to separate the issue of substantive compliance from the legal issue of sovereign
immunity. See Environmental Compliance, supra note 49, at 188 (statement of F. Henry Habicht
II, DOJ) (stating position of DOJ in state-initiated litigation against federal agencies). The DOJ
explained this position by saying:
To prevent this purely legal issue [of sovereign immunity waivers] from interfering
with expeditious compliance, [the DOJ has] proceeded directly to take steps to conform
with the substantive requirements of the law, while at the same time testing in
litigation the narrow issue of whether certain of the federal environmental statutes
have waived sovereign immunity for the payment of civil penalties.
Id. at 188 n.1. Some did not accept this argument. See id. at 130-31 (statement of Kathleen D.
Mix, State of Washington) (criticizing DOJ position). However, Ohio indicates that the position
is sincere. The DOE settled the substantive claims against it before the district court ruled on
the DOE's sovereign immunity motions. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1632.
127. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (1988) (requiring clear
waiver).
128. See FFCA, supra note 14, § 102(a)(3) (subjecting federal agencies to all penalties and
fines). The FFCA provides that:
The Federal, State, interstate, and local substantive and procedural requirements
referred to in this subsection include, but are not limited to, all administrative orders
and all civil and administrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether such penalties
or fines are punitive or coercive in nature or are imposed for isolated, intermittent,
or continuing violations. The United States hereby expressly waives any immunity
otherwise applicable to the United States with respect to any such substantive or
procedural requirement (including, but not limited to, any injunctive relief, adminis-
trative order or civil or administrative penalty or fine referred to in the preceding
sentence, or reasonable service charge).
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set out in Ohio and precludes the application of the logic the Ohio Court
used. 29 Thus, federal facilities now will be liable for civil penalties imposed
by state regulatory bodies when states find RCRA violations. Furthermore,
states can subject the facilities to these penalties without resorting to
expensive and time consuming litigation. 30 Rather, the FFCA allows states
to choose from a number of different enforcement mechanisms that include
administrative orders, civil penalties, and civil actions.'
Second, even if a state wanted to vindicate its interest in a citizen's
suit, the FFCA clarifies the state's ability to do so. The statute does this
simply by defining "person" to include the United States. 132 This definition
eliminates the crucial step in Ohio's reasoning that permitted the Court
to find no waiver in the citizen suit provisions.'33
A third important provision of the FFCA waives a federal employee's
immunity from criminal prosecution. 34 Criminal sanctions can play a
significant role in achieving federal facility compliance. 3 5 Prior to the
FFCA, courts took differing views on whether federal employees could be
prosecuted for environmental crimes.' 36 Commentators raised several con-
129. See Ohio, 112 S. Ct. at 1633 (requiring clear and unambiguous waiver). The FFCA
satisfies the clear and unambiguous standard. It states that the United States is "expressly"
waiving its immunity as to "any ... substantive or procedural requirement (including, but not
limited to, any injunctive relief, administrative order or civil or administrative penalty or
fine ... )." FFCA, supra note 14, § 102(a)(3) (emphasis added).
130. See Federal Facilities Compliance, supra note 29, at 40 (statement of Christine 0.
Gregoire, Director, Washington Dep't of Ecology) (stating that pre-FFCA litigation delays were
significant, lead to little real action, and decreased enforcement flexibility).
131. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 886, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1317, 1317.
132. FFCA, supra note 14, § 103, 106 Stat. at 1507.
133. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1634 (1992) (noting that
RCRA and CWA definition of "person" did not include United States).
134. FFCA, supra note 14, § 102(a)(4), 106 Stat. at 1505-06. The statute reads: "An agent,
employee, or officer of the United States shall be subject to any criminal sanction (including,
but not limited to, any fine or imprisonment) under any Federal or State solid or hazardous
waste law ..... Id.
135. See Irish, supra note 71, at 284-85 (observing that "[c]riminal sanctions get the
attention of the regulated community and persuade it to obey the law"); Smith, supra note 58,
at 8 & n.23 (discussing efficacy of criminal penalties as indirect incentive to comply with
environmental laws). Smith went so far as to argue that, based upon her experiences in the
DOJ, federal officers responsible for environmental compliance efforts would be deterred more
by the potential stigma associated with a criminal conviction than with a civil penalty. Smith,
supra note 58, at 8 n.23. See generally Note, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws on
Federal Facilities, 59 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 938 (1991) (discussing problem and suggesting
recklessness standard for federal employees).
The distinction between state and federal prosecutions is also important. See infra notes
136-37 (discussing distinction). State prosecutions are significant not only because multiple
prosecutions produces more compliance, but also because states would not be constrained by
internal executive branch politics that may prevent prosecutions of high level federal employees
by the DOJ. Smith, supra note 58, at 14; see Doyle, supra note 71, at 692 (suggesting use of
independent counsel due to "conflict of interest" when federal employee is accused of wrong-
doing). The trend is towards the application of criminal liability. Irish, supra note 71, at 249.
136. Compare United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 743 (4th Cir. 1990) (upholding conviction
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cerns ranging from different immunity concerns to questions surrounding
state prosecution of state environmental crimes committed on federal
lands. 137 The FFCA's language appears to subject a federal employee to
criminal prosecution. However, the FFCA still might contain a loophole
that would allow federal employees to escape prosecution. 3
of three federal employees for violations of RCRA), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991) and
United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1551 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding conviction of federal
employee for violations of CERCLA but not addressing any immunity issue) with California v.
Walters, 751 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1984) (amended 1985) (per curiam) (preventing prosecution
for RCRA violations of federal official in his official capacity).
In Dee, the three codefendants were civilian employees of the U.S. Army at the Aberdeen
Proving Ground. Dee, 912 F.2d at 743. The Aberdeen facility was subject to an umbrella
RCRA permit allowing storage of hazardous wastes at three separate locations. Id. Prosecutors
charged the defendants on a four-count indictment alleging various violations of the above
permit and the RCRA rules. Id. The employees claimed that they were not subject to prosecution
because Congress did not define "person" in the RCRA to include the United States. Id. at
744. As employees of the United States, then, the defendants argued that they too were immune
from prosecution. The court rejected this argument. Because the defendants were charged as
individuals and not as federal employees, they were clearly "persons" within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 6903(15). Dee, 912 F.2d at 744. The Dee decision seems to make the immunity
issue a question of proper pleading by the prosecuting authority.
The Walters court reached a conclusion inapposite to Dee. In Walters, a state prosecutor
indicted the defendant, the administrator of the Veterans Administration, in his official capacity.
Waiters, 751 F.2d at 978. The defendant allegedly violated California law by improperly disposing
of hazardous medical waste. Id. However, the parties agreed that the case was "in essence"
against the United States. Id. Thus, the court turned to the RCRA immunity waiver section to
determine if the suit was allowable. The court held that the RCRA barred the suit because the
term "requirements" in 42 U.S.C. § 6961 did not include criminal prosecutions. Those
prosecutions are not, therefore, included in the immunity waiver. Walters, 751 F.2d at 978.
137. See generally Irish, supra note 71 (discussing exclusive federal enclave status); Smith,
supra note 58 (discussing sovereign immunity, intergovernmental immunity, official immunity
and exclusive federal enclave status). Smith distinguishes various immunities that criminal
prosecutions of federal employees raise. She defines each of four immunities federal employees
could use as defenses. They include: sovereign immunity, official immunity, intergovernmental
immunity, and exclusive federal enclave status. See Smith, supra note 58, at 18-24, 28-55
(defining each immunity and discussing each immunity's significance as defense to state initiated
prosecution of federal employees); Irish, supra note 71, at 250-58 (discussing source of and case
law regarding exclusive federal enclave doctrine).
The significance of each immunity varies depending upon whether the state or federal
government brings the prosecution. Smith concludes that while the various immunities she
identifies present problems for state prosecutions, they do not inhibit federal prosecutions.
Smith, supra note 58, at 59-63.
138. See Smith, supra note 58, at 68-71 (discussing legislative solutions to immunity
problems in criminal context). Smith examines H.R. 3847, a precursor to the FFCA. The
language of H.R. 3847 regarding criminal sanctions is identical to the FFCA's. Compare H.R.
3847, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 602(a)(4) (1990) (waiving immunity of federal employees) with
FFCA, supra note 14, § 102(a)(4), 106 Stat. at 1505-06 (same). H.R. 3847's language "washed
away the common law doctrine of official immunity. . . ." Smith, supra note 58, at 68.
Similarly, the language of the FFCA, as found in the precursor H.R. 3847, has eliminated
problems with sovereign immunity and expanded the waiver of intergovernmental immunity.
Id. at 68-69.
What H.R. 3847 missed, according to Smith, and thus what the FFCA is missing, is the
19931
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:801
Finally, the FFCA creates serious constitutional concerns when it
addresses the inability of the EPA to effectively enforce federal laws
against federal polluters. The concerns include both separation of powers
problems and justiciability questions. 13 9 The FFCA provides that the EPA
may commence an "administrative enforcement action" against a federal
agency or department for violations of the RCRA.' 40 The EPA must
initiate such an action against a federal agency just as it would against
any other polluter.' 4' If the EPA did issue an administrative order, it
could collect civil penalties from the target agency. 142 The FFCA, however,
prevents an administrative order from becoming effective until after the
agency that is the object of the order has had an opportunity to confer
with the Administrator of the EPA about the order. 43 The FFCA's
provisions do not address directly the questions presented by a civil action
instituted by the EPA against another agency.'44
The FFCA is an important piece of legislation. However, close analysis
reveals that Congress has failed to correct all of the effects of the Ohio
decision. The FFCA is flawed because Ohio and subsequent cases have a
much broader scope than does the FFCA. Thus, Ohio and its progeny
will continue to undercut the effectiveness of other environmental laws
by calling into question their ability to subject the federal government to
certain enforcement tools. As the next section will show, the FFCA does
not address the broad scope of Ohio.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE FFCA's EFFECTIVENESS
A. The Civil Penalties Issue
The FFCA fails to address significant issues because its provisions do
not apply broadly enough to all environmental statutes. Its most glaring
omission is the failure to address the federal facilities section of the CWA.
necessary clarity with regard to the exclusive federal enclave doctrine. Specifically, the FFCA
does not say explicitly that state authorities can prosecute federal employees in state courts for
violating state laws. See id. at 69 (lodging same criticism against H.R. 3847). Granted, the
FFCA does say "any criminal sanction." But, when considered in light of the tone set by Ohio,
the language could mean federal sanctions or state sanctions. Thus, further strengthening is in
order. See id. (suggesting possible statutory wording).
139. See infra notes 171-93 and accompanying text (discussing separation of powers and
justiciability problems created by federal level enforcement).
140. FFCA, supra note 14, sec. 102(b), § 6001(b)(1), 106 Stat. at 1506. The meaning of
"administrative enforcement action" is not readily apparent. See infra text accompanying notes
202-03 (suggesting probable meaning of "administrative enforcement action").
141. FFCA, supra note 14, sec. 102(b), § 6001(b)(1), 106 Stat. at 1506.
142. Id. (forcing EPA to pursue administrative order against federal polluter just as it
would against private polluter); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (1988) (allowing imposition of penalty
pursuant to EPA order not to exceed $25,000 per day per violation).
143. FFCA, supra note 14, sec. 102(b), § 6001(b)(2), 106 Stat. at 1506.
144. See infra notes 209-30 and accompanying text (discussing civil action issue in context
of FFCA).
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The Ohio Court held that the CWA federal facilities section did not waive
sovereign immunity for the assessment of civil penalties, 145 yet the FFCA
does not address the CWA provisions. 46 Consequently, states and citizen
groups are left with an ambiguous immunity waiver when it comes to the
assessment of civil penalties for violations of the CWA.' 47
The FFCA's omission of the CWA is not mitigated by arguing that
the CWA and the RCRA are redundant. They are not. 4 In some instances
a CWA violation will occur at a federal facility but a RCRA violation
will not. 149 In such a case, the enforcer of the law will be unable to obtain
civil penalties because Congress has yet to state clearly the immunity
waiver.
Another oversight limits the FFCA civil penalties waiver. The Ohio
decision will have, and in some cases already is beginning to have, a major
effect on the interpretation of other federal facilities provisions. Ohio
could affect both the CERCLA and the CAA. In Maine v. Department
of Navy50 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit used
Ohio to hold that the federal facility provision in the CERCLA was not
a clear and unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity.'-'
The CERCLA waiver section purports to be clear and explicit. Federal
facilities must comply with "[s]tate laws regarding enforcement."'1 2 The
reference to "enforcement" seems to include civil penalties. It runs counter
to the substance-procedure distinction explained earlier because "enforce-
ment" could include the procedural aspects of enforcement.1'3 Addition-
145. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1631 (1992).
146. See H.R. 340, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (amending CWA with provision identical
to FFCA).
147. See Pennsylvania v. United States Postal Serv., 810 F. Supp. 605, 612 (M.D. Penn.
1992) (preventing state from recovering civil penalties against Postal Service due to absence of
CWA waiver). The result in Pennsylvania would have been different if the FFCA had included
provisions applicable to the CWA because the district court decided Pennsylvania on December
30, 1992, after the FFCA's effective date. See FFCA, supra note 14, § 102(c), 106 Stat. at 1506
(making waiver provisions effective upon date of passage).
148. See Gleason & Goutzounis, supra note 6, at 289 & nn.5-6 (noting divergent purposes
of CWA and RCRA); House Republican Seeks Waiver or Federal Clean Water Act Immunity,
Inside EPA, Jan. 15, 1993, at 17 (describing DOE as generally more compliant with CWA but
noting DOD maintenance of hundreds of wastewater treatment works around country); supra
notes 42-48 and accompanying text (discussing general purpose of RCRA and CWA).
149. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 (1991) (excluding certain materials from RCRA definition of
hazardous or solid waste).
150. 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992).
151. Maine v. Department of Navy, 973 F.2d 1007, 1011 (Ist Cir. 1992). Maine arose
when the state of Maine alleged violations of the state's federally approved hazardous waste
laws. Id. The Navy agreed to comply substantively with the state laws but refused to pay a
civil penalty of $887,200 the state had imposed. Id. at 1009. The case also involved a related
immunity issue concerning state assessment of fees. See id. at 1011-15 (discussing ability of
state to impose reasonable licensing and waste disposal fees upon federal facilities).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(4) (1988).
153. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (explaining substance-procedure distinc-
tion).
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ally, "enforcement" is much more likely to include punitive civil penalties
than is the RCRA term "requirements," thus distinguishing the RCRA
waiver provision from the CERCLA waiver provision.
However, the Maine court, relying upon the Ohio analysis, found
ambiguity in the term "enforcement."'1 54 The term could mean either
coercive penalties assessed for violations of court orders or punitive civil
penalties assessed for past violations of removal or remediation require-
ments.155 Where statutory language is ambiguous, a waiver of sovereign
immunity will fail.
The CAA is the second statute drawn into question by Ohio. The
language of the CAA is nearly identical to the language of the CWA. The
CAA provides that federal facilities "shall be subject to, and comply with,
all .. .requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions
respecting the control and abatement of air pollution" as would any other
facility. i 6 The CWA uses identical language in the relevant portion of the
statute. 157
Ohio's holding that the CWA does not waive sovereign immunity
creates significant doubt that courts will construe the CAA to include such
a waiver." 8 Potentially, the CAA has a better chance of surviving scrutiny
by the Court on this point because the CAA has a clear statement in its
legislative history that the applicable sanctions include civil penalties. s9
The CWA does not have such a reference in its legislative history. 60 Three
154. Maine, 973 F.2d at 1010-11.
155. See id. at 1011 (discussing possible ambiguity). The Maine court observed that:
Maine's argument [on CERCLA § 9620(a)(4)] is open to the Supreme Court's
observation concerning RCRA section 6961 that "the statute makes no mention of
any mechanism for penalizing past violations, and this absence of any example of
punitive fines is powerful evidence that Congress had no intent to subject the United
States to an enforcement mechanism that could deplete the federal fisc regardless of
a responsible officer's willingness and capacity to comply in the future."
Id. (quoting Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1640 (1992)).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1988).
157. See 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988) (making applicable to federal facilities certain CWA
requirements). The differences between the two provisions are purely cosmetic. See Rothmel,
supra note 8, at 603 (observing that CWA was amended in committee to parallel language used
in CAA).
158. But see Axline et al., supra note 6, at 23-25 (arguing that CAA waivers are clear);
Rothmel, supra note 8, at 599 ("No statute waives sovereign immunity ... more clearly than
the CAA"). Both of these articles were written before Ohio.
159. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 200, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1077, 1279 (giving Congressional intent). The House report stated:
The applicable sanctions are to be the same for [f]edera facilities and personnel as
for privately owned pollution sources and for the owners or operators thereof. This
means that [flederal facilities and agencies may be subject to injunctive relief (and
criminal or civil contempt citations to enforce any such injunctions), to civil or
criminal penalties, and to delayed compliance penalties ....
Id.
160. See S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 67, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326,
4392 (discussing federal facilities provision without specific reference to punitive civil penalties);
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district courts have found a waiver of civil penalties in the CAA. 161
Recent Supreme Court precedent, however, diminishes the usefulness
of the CAA's favorable legislative history. In United States v. Nordic
Village, Inc.,162 the Court held that a sovereign immunity waiver must be
clear and unambiguous without reference to the legislative history of the
statutory provision containing the waiver.1 63 Similarly, the Ohio Court did
H.R. Co~N. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 93, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326,
4468 (same). In fact, the Senate Report devotes more discussion to dredging activities of the
Army Corp of Engineers than to civil penalties. See S. REP. No. 370, supra, at 68, reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4393 (discussing Corp of Engineers dredging operations).
161. See United States v. Air Pollution Control Bd., No. 88-1030, order at 3 (M.D. Tenn.
Mar. 2, 1990) (interpreting CAA federal facilities provision); Ohio ex rel. Celebreeze v. United
States Dep't of the Air Force, [1987] 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210, 21,213 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 31, 1987) (same); Alabama ex rel. Graddick v. Veterans Admin., 648 F. Supp. 1208,
1211-12 (M.D. Ala. 1986) (same); see also Karen S. Cleveland & Jack A. Van KIey, Compliance
at Federal Facilities: A State Perspective, 1 FED. FAcLrIs ENvTL. J. 301, 302-03 (1990)
(discussing cases cited above).
In Ohio v. Department of the Air Force the state claimed that the Air Force operated
boilers at two installations without first obtaining permits under Ohio law adopted pursuant to
the CAA. 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 21,211. The state sought an injunction and
civil penalties. Id. The Air Force argued that the CAA, when compared to other statutes
amended about the same time as the CAA, did not allow assessment of civil penalties. Id. The
court responded by examining the language and legislative history of the RCRA, the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the CWA, and the CAA. Id. at 21,211-13. In analyzing these
statutes, the court concluded that the order in which Congress enacted them was significant.
Id. at 21,213. The order suggested that Congress intended the CAA's language to extend to
civil penalties, even though the other acts may not have. Id. The court also rejected the Air
Force's argument that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 21,214. Consequently,
the court held for the state. Id.
In Alabama the state sued the Veterans Administration (VA), a general contractor, and a
subcontractor for violations of the CAA arising out of asbestos removal at a VA facility. 648
F. Supp. at 1209. All of the defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Id. The VA also filed a motion to dismiss based upon
sovereign immunity. Id. The court rejected the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, noting
that 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d)(1), 7418(a) and 7604 granted the plaintiffs both standing to bring
the action and created liability for the defendants' violations. Alabama, 648 F. Supp. at 1209-
11. The court also rejected the defendants' failure to state a claim motions. Id. at 1211. Finally,
the court rejected the VA's sovereign immunity argument. The clear language of CAA § 7418
and the legislative history both indicate Congress's intention to waive sovereign immunity and
overrule Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976). Alabama, 648 F. Supp. at 1211. Thus, the
court held against the defendants. Id. at 1212.
162. 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992).
163. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1016 (1992). The Court stated:
"As in the Eleventh Amendment context the 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of sovereign
immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text. If clarity does not exist there,
it cannot be supplied by a committee report." Id. (citations omitted). But see Hancock v. Train,
426 U.S. 163, 183 (1972) (using legislative history to determine scope of waiver); Smith, supra
note 11, at 56 (suggesting that courts may use legislative history).
In Nordic Village, the Court considered whether § 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code waived
the sovereign immunity of the United States from an action seeking a monetary recovery in
bankruptcy. 112 S. Ct. at 1013. An officer of a corporation in bankruptcy used corporate funds
to pay individual income tax liability. Id. The bankruptcy trustee sought to recover that
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not refer to the legislative history of the CWA or the RCRA even though
a potential argument existed. 64 Thus, courts likely would ignore the CAA
legislative history, which is tenuous authority in any case.' 61 Ignoring
legislative history further suggests that the three district court cases referred
to above, each of which relied to a varying degree on legislative history,
would be decided differently today. 6
6
Furthermore, the CWA is broader textually than the CAA. 67 The
CWA contains the provision, thoroughly analyzed by the Supreme Court,
that the United States will be liable for "only those civil penalties arising
under federal law."' 6 Congress did not include this language in the CAA
payment. Id. The Court determined that § 106(c) was subject to two interpretations, neither of
which authorized monetary relief against the IRS. Id. at 1015. First, the statute could allow
declaratory and injunctive relief but not monetary relief. Id. at 1015-16. Second, the statute
might be read to trigger a waiver in any other portion of the statute that used the terms
contained in § 106(c)(1). Id. at 1016. Finally, the Court rejected several alternative arguments,
including that the general jurisdiction statute in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) waives sovereign immunity
and that a bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction over property overrides sovereign immunity.
Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1016-17. Consequently, the Court reversed the courts below and
held for the IRS. Id. at 1017.
164. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 1990)
(advancing congressional intent argument), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992). The congressional
intent argument advanced by the State of Ohio was that to the extent that the CWA was
amended at the same time as the CAA and in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976), and Hancock
v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976), the language clearly waives sovereign immunity for civil penalties.
Ohio, 904 F.2d at 1060-61. The Supreme Court in Hancock held that the then-existing provisions
of the CAA did not require that federal facilities obtain a permit to pollute from a state that
was operating a federally approved pollution control plan. 426 U.S. at 198-99. The Court in
California made the same holding with respect to the CWA. 426 U.S. at 227.
165. See H.R. Rap. No. 294, supra note 159, at 200, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1279 (stating congressional intent). The problem with this statement of "intent" is that, in light
of the Ohio distinction between coercive and punitive civil penalties, it does not itself distinguish
between coercive and punitive civil penalties.
166. See supra note 161 (discussing district court cases holding that CAA waives sovereign
immunity).
167. See 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988) (providing "arising under federal law" language). Most
previous courts and commentators thought that the "arising under federal law" passage
evidenced a congressional intent that the CWA contains a narrower waiver than the CAA. See
Ohio ex rel. Celebreeze v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, [1987] 17 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210, 21,213 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 1987) (interpreting CAA as broader than
CWA waiver); Rothmel, supra note 8, at 599-602 (same). The plain language does seem to
indicate a narrower waiver. But when considered in the context of how the Court has used the
additional sentence, it is not necessarily true that the waiver in the CWA is narrower than the
waiver in the CAA.
The primary issue being addressed here is whether the Court would decide the CAA
differently simply because it lacks the "arising under federal law" language. The answer must
be no. The Supreme Court based its analysis in Ohio upon the meaning of the word "sanction"
and, secondarily, upon the "arising under" language. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy,
112 S. Ct. 1627, 1636-39 (1992). Thus, the "arising under" language provided the Court with
an additional opportunity, not present in the CAA, to find a waiver of sovereign immunity.
The words "textually broader" as used in the text, then, are meant to capture this concept.
168. 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988).
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federal facility section. Because the text of the CAA offers fewer possi-
bilities for finding a waiver, and the text of the statute is what a court
will look to in determining the waiver, 169 future courts that address the
issue should conclude that the CAA does not waive sovereign immunity
for punitive civil penalties.
The FFCA does not amend the CERCLA or the CAA federal facility
waiver provision. Consequently, the CERCLA remains without a clear
waiver under Maine and the CAA is also open to question. The uncertainty
that now exists under both the CERCLA and the CAA demonstrates the
effect that Ohio might have on the interpretation of immunity waivers in
the future. 70 Given these effects, the FFCA sovereign immunity waiver
does not go far enough and, therefore, the provision is not as effective
as it might have been. However, the immunity waiver is only half the
problem. The FFCA also raises significant constitutional issues.
B. Constitutional Issues Raised by the FFCA
1. Overview of Primary Constitutional Concerns
The FFCA raises two constitutional concerns .'7  The first is justicia-
bility. The Constitution provides that the judicial branch may only adju-
dicate cases or controversies.1 72 Courts interpret Article III to require that
169. See supra note 163 (revealing that Supreme Court relies upon statutory text to
determine if Congress waived immunity).
170. See Strand & Samuels, supra note 84, at 309 (arguing that very fact ambiguity exists
supports conclusion of inadequate waiver).
171. But cf. FFCA, supra note 14, sec. 102(b), § 6001(c), 106 Stat. at 1506 (earmarking
fines awarded to states for environmental protection projects). This provision could raise
federalism concerns. Indeed, Congress did not include a similar provision in the CAA, perhaps
because of federalism concerns. See Federal Facilities Compliance, supra note 29, at 22 (statement
of National Conference of State Legislators) (criticizing earmarking provisions as violating
federalism). See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2427-29 (1992) (holding that
statute requiring state to take title to hazardous waste was unconstitutional "commandeering"
of state's regulatory apparatus).
172. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Constitution provides that:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority;-to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls;-to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;-to contro-
versies to which the United States shall be a party;-to controversies between two or
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between citizens of
different states;-between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of
different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states,
citizens or subjects.
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parties to a lawsuit have a concrete or personal stake in the outcome to
satisfy the justiciability requirement. ' A suit between two agencies whose
heads serve at the pleasure of the President might not be justiciable
because the United States would appear on both sides of the lawsuit.
174
In essence, the lawsuit would ask the court to issue an advisory opinion.
75
Those on the other side of the justiciability argument, however, point
to several courts that have not found justiciability problems with suits
between two executive branch agencies. 76 These courts have fashioned
essentially a three-part test. A court has jurisdiction to resolve an intra-
branch controversy if (1) the dispute is concrete; (2) the dispute involves
issues traditionally considered as justiciable; and (3) Congress has not
barred the action by statute.
77
Justiciability presents significant concerns, but the resolution of the
issue turns on the interpretation of the case law. That case law is distinct
from the situation in which the EPA is suing another cabinet agency such
as the DOD. The litigants, in cases cited by those who believe that
intrabranch disputes are justiciable, were not agencies whose heads were
removable at will by the President. 78 Thus, the cases do not necessarily
173. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11-12 & n.10 (1976) (noting that justiciability
requires personal stake in outcome).
174. MORTON ROSENBERG, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF
AGENCY DECISIONS AND DECISION MAKERS: TnE UNITARY ExECuTIvE THEORY AND SEPARATION
OF POwERS 43-44 (1987), reprinted in Environmental Compliance, supra note 49, at 10, 63-64
[hereinafter CRS REP.]. The potential nonjusticiable lawsuit in the instant context is between
the EPA and another federal agency accused of environmental violations.
175. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 252, 257 (1990)
(stating that case or controversy clause prohibits courts from issuing advisory opinions or
deciding cases that are not concrete or adverse).
176. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974) (holding that no barrier to
justiciability existed where both parties were officers of executive branch); United States v. ICC,
337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949) (holding that action by United States against Interstate Commerce
Commission was traditionally justiciable); United States v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 694 F.2d
793, 809-10 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (adopting panel decision holding that case or controversy
did exist between United States as sovereign and independent agency of United States).
177. See CRS REP., supra note 174, at 51 (citing United States v. ICC and its progeny).
See generally Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government
Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 893 (1991) (discussing justiciability topic).
178. See Letter from John R. Bolton, Ass't Att'y Gen., DOJ, to Rep. John D. Dingell 3
(Dec. 20, 1985), reprinted in Environmental Compliance, supra note 49, at 709, 711 [hereinafter
Bolton Letter] (arguing that no case has decided justiciability of legal controversy between two
agencies whose heads serve at pleasure of President); see also Mail Order Assoc. of Am. v.
United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 527 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (declining to decide
intrabranch dispute on justiciability grounds).
In Mail Order Association, the court addressed a dispute between the Postal Rate
Commission (PRC) and the U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors (Board) over a postal rate
set by the PRC. Id. at 510. At issue was whether the Postal Reorganization Act (PRA) permitted
the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to seek judicial review of such a rate after the DOJ specifically
had refused to provide counsel for such review. Id. The court determined, based on statutory
construction of the PRA, that Congress intended the Board to seek judicial review of certain
PRC determinations. Id. at 522. To allow the DOJ unilaterally to determine when the judicial
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establish that a concrete dispute would exist where the litigants are both
removable at will.
Courts also might turn to the political question doctrine to resolve
this issue. The political question doctrine is a special form of justiciabil-
ity. 1' 9 This doctrine attempts to limit a court's involvement in cases in
which the court might have to resolve questions committed by the Con-
stitution to a coordinate branch of government. 10 The inquiry is relevant
because it combines both the separation of powers issue and the justicia-
bility issue."" In sum, the justiciability of an intrabranch dispute is an
open issue, but one that courts can resolve by interpretation and appli-
cation of precedent.
A second, more intractable, constitutional issue raised by federal
facility enforcement is a separation of powers question.18 2 The concern
review could be exercised would veto the judicial review option in contravention of Congress's
intent. Id. Whether the Board is removable at will by the President is not clear. See Mackie v.
Bush, 809 F. Supp. 144, 148 (D.D.C. 1993) (granting preliminary injunction against President
Bush preventing him from removing Board until appeals court decided case); id. at 147 n.3
(suggesting that USPS is independent agency and thus governors not subject to at-will removal).
The appeals court did not decide the removal issue in Mail Order Association. See 986 F.2d at
812 (discussing background of case and noting removal attempt by President). Thus, it is
possible that even this most recent case does not support the justiciability of a suit between
two agencies whose heads were removable at will by the President.
179. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (holding that apportionment challenge
did not present a nonjusticiable political question).
180. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (listing as
one of three factors in political question inquiry whether deciding case would involve resolution
of questions committed by Constitution to coordinate government branches).
181. See id. (establishing three-part inquiry for political question doctrine). The political
question doctrine poses three questions: (1) does the issue involve resolution of questions
committed by the Constitution to a coordinate branch of government; (2) would resolving the
issue take the court outside areas of judicial expertise; (3) do prudential considerations counsel
against judicial intervention? Id.
As to the second inquiry, it would be within a court's competence to resolve factual or
legal disputes over the applicability of environmental standards. Deciding cases is what courts
do. The third inquiry is indeterminate in this situation. Some of the considerations may include
the extent to which the court views the decision as a political one and whether multiple
interpretations of the Constitution would result from intervening in the case. See id. at 1000
(discussing prudential concerns).
The first concern is most applicable. It turns upon "an examination of the constitutional
provisions governing the exercise of the power in question." Id. at 998. Indeed, political
questions are usually not justiciable because of separation of powers. Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969). A court could decide that because enforcement issues are raised, and
because enforcement is usually committed to the President, a suit by one agency against another
is not justiciable. See infra notes 182-93 and accompanying text (discussing separation of powers
problem); infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text (discussing President's enforcement discre-
tion). The political question doctrine, then, further blurs the distinction between Article III and
separation of powers issues. See infra note 188 (suggesting potential view of distinction).
182. See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 341-42 (discussing separation of powers). Separation
of powers concerns are the heart of the entire debate. The clearly framed separation of powers
questio/n concerns the EPA's ability to issue administrative orders and to sue other federal
agencies. This conflict addresses whether the judiciary intrudes upon executive powers when it
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takes the form of a legal theory called the unitary executive. 3 This theory
posits that the President is the one individual ultimately accountable for
the actions of the executive branch.8 4 The executive branch is hierarchical
and all executive branch agencies are subordinate to the President." 5
The constitutional basis for the unitary executive theory is the Take
Care Clause. Found in Article II of the Constitution, the clause provides
that "[the President] shall take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted . , "186 Therefore, the President alone is entitled to control the
actions of the executive branch, to the exclusion of others. Unitary
executive theorists buttress this conclusion by reference to Federalist No.
70 and Myers v. United States.'17 While the justiciability and separation
of powers issues are closely related and hence confusing, they are distin-
guishable concepts in the federal facility context. 8
decides executive intrabranch disputes. The sovereign immunity issue is also a separation of
powers debate. In that context, the clash is between the judiciary and the legislature on who
will determine how U.S. funds will be spent. See Environmental Compliance, supra note 49, at
187-88 (statement of F. Henry Habicht II) (discussing reasons for asserting sovereign immunity
defense).
183. See Babich, supra note 6, at 30 (introducing unitary executive concept). Uncertainty
exists about what the unitary executive refers to-separation of powers or justiciability concerns.
This Note's terminology operates on the assumption that the unitary executive is concerned
with the former. When the DOJ formally broached the theory, it did not refer to justiciability
or cite to any of the cases in supra note 176. Rather, it only spoke to the intrusion of the
judiciary into executive decisionmaking power-a classic separation of powers problem. See
Environmental Compliance, supra note 49, at 206-13 (statement of F. Henry Habicht II)
(discussing constitutional basis of unitary executive).
184. See Frank B. Cross, The Surviving Significance of the Unitary Executive, 27 Hous.
L. REv. 599, 659 (1990) (stating that key reason for unity in executive branch is its role in
holding executive accountable to public).
185. See Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olsen: A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court
Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. Rnv. 313, 316 (1989) (stating that President's power to execute laws
includes authority to give directions to those who assist him); Letter from Robert A. McConnell,
Ass't Att'y Gen., DOJ, to Rep. John D. Dingell 2 (Oct. 11, 1983), reprinted in Environmental
Compliance, supra note 49, at 678, 679 [hereinafter McConnell Letter] (asserting power of
President to exert "general administrative control" over subordinate executive officers). See
generally Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the.Chief Administrator: The Framers
and the President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991 (1993) (using framers' intent
arguments to support unitary executive theory).
186. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
187. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Myers supports the unitary executive theory to the extent it
acknowledges the framers' intent that the government execute laws in a "unitary and uniform"
way. Id. at 135. Myers also recognizes the importance of the Take Care Clause as the textual
basis for the theory. Id. at 161-64; see also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405-06 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (discussing need and authority for presidential control over executive policymaking);
Environmental Compliance, supra note 49, at 206-10 (statement of F. Henry Habicht II, DOJ)
(discussing constitutional basis for unitary executive); Steinberg, supra note 6, at 325-28 (same).
Federalist No. 70 establishes the foundation for an original intent argument to complement
the Constitution's text. It discusses the desirability and importance of unity in the executive
branch. Tim FEDERAUST No. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
188. See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980) (stating that
one purpose of case or controversy clause is to assure that federal courts will not intrude into
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Critics of the unitary executive theory argue that proponents of the
unitary executive theory mistakenly apply the Take Care Clause. The
founders did not intend the clause to create a hierarchical executive, nor
to imply that the Executive has the power to forbid execution of laws and
thus pervert congressional intent.8 9 Instead, the clause makes clear that
the President has a duty to ensure that other executive branch agencies
comply with Congress's instructions. 190 Similarly, opponents of the unitary
executive theory cite cases establishing that the three branches of govern-
ment are not "hermetically" 191 sealed from one another. 192 Any diminution
of executive power is minimal and, to the extent diminution occurs, it is
justified by Congress's need to provide for effective environmental en-
forcement.193
Two situations in the context of federal facility compliance raise
problems with separation of powers. The remainder of this section will
focus upon these two situations. 94 The first occurs when the EPA attempts
to issue administrative orders against other federal agencies. The second
occurs when the EPA attempts to sue another agency in federal court.
areas committed to other branches). Under justiciability, the question is whether an Article III
court can hear the case. This is a question that only the courts can decide and their decision
is final. The separation of powers concerns, however, while of course subject to judicial review,
can be understood more readily if viewed as a problem for executive branch resolution.
A simple factual scenario will clarify the distinction. Suppose the EPA discovers information
showing that the DOD was violating environmental standards. The EPA proposes to file a civil
lawsuit against the DOD to obtain enforcement. Because the President is sworn to uphold the
Constitution, the President must decide whether the prosecution of the case would violate
separation of powers before the case even gets to the courts. If a violation would result, then
the President should order the EPA not to pursue the case. If, however, the suit does not pose
a separation of powers concern, then it could proceed. It is presumably at this point that a
DOD motion to dismiss would raise the justiciability issue. See Memorandum from John M.
Harmon, Ass't Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Michael J. Egan, Assoc. Att'y Gen. 3
(June 23, 1978), reprinted in Environmental Compliance, supra note 49, at 668, 670 [hereinafter
Egan Memorandum] (setting out similar hypothetical and discussing implications).
189. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1124 (9th Cir.) (arguing that duty to
execute laws does not imply power to forbid their implementation), reh'g en banc ordered sub
nom., Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ball, 863 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1988).
190. See Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative Over Agencies and Agency Decision-
makers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive,
57 GEO. WAsH. L. Ray. 627, 650-51 (1989) (arguing that Take Care Clause does not vest
absolute power in President to control subordinate officials and that Congress retains ability to
assign powers to heads of departments).
191. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
192. See CRS REP., supra note 174, at 41-59 (discussing and applying decisions on
separation of powers); Steinberg, supra note 6, at 343-52 (same).
193. See CRS REP., supra note 174, at 53 (listing reasons why congressional intrusion upon
executive powers is minimal); Steinberg, supra note 6, at 350-52 (same, but conceding possibility
of finding more than de minimis intrusion); infra note 217 (describing separation of powers
balancing test).
194. See supra notes 172-81 and accompanying text (discussing justiciability arguments and
suggesting potential resolution).
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2. EPA Administrative Order Authority
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) concern with the proposed FFCA
was that the EPA ability to issue unilateral and contested administrative
orders would violate the unitary executive theory by entangling the judicial
and executive branches. 95 Entanglement would occur when the EPA issued
a unilateral administrative order without prior opportunity for consultation
between the affected agency and the EPA. 196 The RCRA makes the
violation of an administrative order a basis for a citizen suit. 9 7 Therefore,
when the target agency contested the subject matter of the EPA unilateral
order, it would have no choice but to violate the order and risk exposure
to a citizen suit. If a citizen group did sue, the suit would force a court
into the role of arbiter for what was essentially an intrabranch dispute
between the EPA and the target agency. 9s
The unitary executive, however, can take two forms, and it is not
clear which form the DOJ is advancing in the context of the EPA
administrative order authority. A "strong" unitary executive would require
that the President must resolve intrabranch disputes. A "weak" unitary
executive would require that the President should have the first opportunity
to resolve intrabranch disputes. The DOJ position with respect to admin-
istrative orders, as described in the preceding paragraph, seems to take
the latter form. 99 However, the DOJ has argued the former in unrelated
litigation .20
195. See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 342 (stating that concern is that judiciary, rather than
executive, would be empowered to decide dispute between two executive agencies).
196. Environmental Compliance, supra note 49, at 211 (statement of F. Henry Habicht II,
DOJ).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (1988).
198. Environmental Compliance, supra note 49, at 211 (statement of F. Henry Habicht II,
DOJ).
199. See id. at 210. Habicht stated that:
Accordingly, Executive Branch agencies may not sue one another, nor may one agency
be ordered by another to comply with an administrative order without the prior
opportunity to contest the order within the Executive Branch. Thus, coercive unilateral
order authority is inconsistent with the constitutional principles of unity and unitary
responsibility within the Executive Branch.
Id.
200. See TVA v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 692, 701 n.9 (1987) (revealing that defendant
(DOE represented by DOJ) argued that Executive Order 12,146 commits resolution of dispute
to executive and suggesting that consequently, judiciary can never decide an intrabranch dispute).
Legitimate arguments can be advanced for either interpretation. See Exec. Order No.
12,146, § 1-402, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1980), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1988) [hereinafter Exec.
Order 12,146] (providing that "prior to proceeding in any court" agencies with legal disputes
submit them to Attorney General). The wording of Executive Order 12,146 makes the unitary
executive appear to be more of a quasi-exhaustion doctrine. Indeed, courts that have examined
Executive Order 12,146 in this context so have concluded. Martin v. Great Lakes Indian Fish
and Wildlife Comm'n, No. 92-C-409-C, 1992 WL 300841 at *4 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 7, 1992);
TVA, 13 Cl. Ct. at 701. That the President signed the FFCA also indicates that the DOJ
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The FFCA responded to the administrative order debate by giving the
EPA the authority to commence an "administrative enforcement action"
against other agencies that are violating federal environmental laws. 20 1
While the meaning of "administrative enforcement action" is not imme-
diately clear, 20 2 it appears to include administrative orders and similar
administrative remedies used by the EPA against private facilities. 20 3 Pur-
suant to the statute, the EPA can exercise this power only after the target




In theory, the EPA now has the option of forcing the issue when nego-
tiations with other agencies on environmental compliance get bogged down.
The FFCA provision concerning administrative orders renders moot
the distinction between the two possible interpretations of the unitary
executive. The opportunity for consultation addresses the weak form of
the unitary executive. However, even if the stronger version applies, the
President does have the power to designate the arbiter of the dispute.
That power comes from the ability of the President to appoint and remove
at will the Administrator of the EPA.20 5 Secondly, existing presidential
directives acknowledge that Congress can enact statutes to govern executive
branch disagreements. Executive Order 12,146 requires submission of
intrabranch legal disputes to the Attorney General for resolution prior to
litigation.206 However, that general requirement does not apply when a
statute specifically has vested the responsibility for resolution elsewhere.
20 7
ascribed to the weak form of the unitary executive.
Yet the unitary executive is grounded upon the theory of accountability in one person for
the uniform execution of the laws. Cross, supra note 184, at 659. Carried to its logical
conclusion, this argument would require that the President must resolve intra-executive disputes.
If that were not the case, then the President routinely could abdicate responsibility for executive
decisionmaking to the courts and usurp the balance of powers in the constitutional system.
201. See FFCA, supra note 14, sec. 102(b), § 6001(b), 106 Stat. at 1506.
202. See 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(12)(G) (Supp. II 1990) (using term "administrative enforce-
ment action"); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e)(2) (1988) (same). Congress has not used the "administrative
enforcement action" terminology extensively. The two statutes above are the only statutes, other
than the amended RCRA federal facilities provision, to use the term according to a Westlaw
search completed on May 27, 1993.
203. See FFCA, supra note 14, sec. 102(b), § 6001(b)(1), 106 Stat. at 1506 (discussing
requirement that EPA initiate "administrative enforcement action[s] ... in the same manner
and under the same circumstances as an action would be initiated against another person"); id.
§ 6001(b)(2) (providing that no administrative order can be finalized until opportunity given to
affected agency to consult with EPA administrator). See also H.R. CoNp. REP. No. 886, supra
note 131, at 19, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1319 (explaining congressional intent).
204. FFCA, supra note 14, sec. 102(b), § 6001(b)(2), 106 Stat. at 1506.
205. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, § 1(b), 84 Stat. 2086, 2086 (1970), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. app. 1 at 1343 (1988) (providing for appointment of Administrator by President);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926) (placing constitutional power of removal with
President); Rosenberg, supra note 190, at 689 (discussing President's powers in policymaking
process).
206. Exec. Order No. 12,146, supra note 200, § 1-402.
207. Id. The importance of Executive Order 12,146 is its acknowledgement of a role for
congressional determination of who would adjudicate intrabranch disputes. The order suggests
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The FFCA does this. It gives the EPA Administrator authority to resolve
enforcement disagreements if existing negotiation mechanisms fail.
208
3. EPA Civil Action Authority
The FFCA has resolved the administrative order issue for now.
20 9
However, the EPA statutory authority to initiate a civil enforcement action
in federal district court under the RCRA is still unresolved. 210 If statutory
that Congress can play a part in this designation via a statutory enactment. However, as to the
central function of the order, viz., preventing intrabranch disputes from going to court, the
mechanism is inadequate. See infra note 218 (discussing inadequacy of Executive Order 12,146
in context of EPA civil action authority).
Further support for the proposition that Congress can direct that a certain governmental
actor can decide intrabranch disputes is inferable from Mail Order Assoc. of Am. v. United
States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The court held there that Congress's intent
in passing the Postal Reorganization Act was to give the Postal Service the ability to decide
when to seek judicial review of postal rate determinations with which it does not agree. Id. at
522. The rate determinations are made by the Postal Rate Commission, another executive
branch agency. The FFCA clearly contemplates that the EPA will be the final arbiter of disputes
through its power to issue administrative orders. To the extent that Congress intended this
structure, Mail Order Association would appear to validate it.
However, Mail Order Association did draw a distinction between an agency seeking judicial
review of an adverse agency determination and an agency seeking judicial enforcement of an
agency's own determination. Citing FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160, 174 (1927), the
court held that excluding the DOJ was more legitimate in the judicial review situation than in
the enforcement situation. Mail Order Association, 986 F.2d at 525. Applying that distinction
to the instant situation, it is clear that Mail Order Association would not support the EPA's
taking independent enforcement action without an opportunity for intrabranch consultation.
208. See FFCA, supra note 14, sec. 102(b), § 6001(b)(2), 106 Stat. at 1506 (requiring
Administrator to allow opportunity for consultation prior to issuance of order); H.R. REP. No.
111, supra note 2, at 17, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1303 ("However, where a federal
agency fails to respond to an administrative complaint or it becomes apparent to the [EPA]
Administrator that negotiations are unlikely to be successful, the committee intends that the
Administrator expeditiously finalize an administrative order").
209. See supra note 200 (indicating signature by President and thus his adoption of "weak"
unitary executive).
210. See infra notes 212-30 and accompanying text (questioning authority of EPA to initiate
civil actions). Prior to the FFCA, civil action authority did not exist in the RCRA. Section
3008(a)(1) allowed civil actions against persons, but section 1003(15) did not define persons to
include the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1988) (excluding United States from list
of entities deemed "person" under RCRA). Furthermore, courts interpreted the term "require-
ments" in section 6001 as subject to the substance versus procedure distinction. See supra notes
56-57 and accompanying text (discussing substance-procedure distinction). Because a civil action
is arguably a means to enforce substantive requirements and not a requirement itself, courts
might have concluded that Congress did not authorize civil actions.
Nor could courts use the legislative history of the RCRA. In fact, the pre-FFCA legislative
history of the RCRA indicates an intent not to allow civil actions against federal agencies. See
H.R. 14496, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 601(a)(3)(A) (1976) (authorizing civil suits by EPA against
other federal agencies); H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6305 (same). The federal facility provision ultimately enacted did not
include the H.R. 14496 provision. Rather, the Senate bill was the progenitor of § 6001. S.
3622, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 223 (1976). This was latter incorporated into S. 2150 and survived
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authority does not exist, then the analysis does not reach the potential
separation of powers concerns that civil actions present.
The FFCA could be read to allow civil actions. Section 103 of the
FFCA modified the definition of "person" in the RCRA to include the
United States and its departments and agencies. Section 3008(a)(1) of the
RCRA remained unchanged by the FFCA, thus continuing to allow civil
suits against "persons." One could conclude from these two provisions
that Congress has allowed the EPA to institute civil actions against federal
polluters.
21'
Examined more closely, however, this construction fails to establish
congressional approval of the EPA civil action authority. The explanation
relies on two statutory interpretation considerations. Initially, Congress,
in the context of the federal facility provision, gave the EPA explicit
authority for "administrative enforcement actions.1 21 2 At the same time,
the FFCA contains no section explicitly granting the power to bring
"judicial enforcement actions. ' 21 3 Thus, the limitation in section 102(b)
of the FFCA to administrative orders to the exclusion of judicial enforce-
ment actions in federal court implies a congressional intent to not authorize
the latter. 21 4 The legislative history of the FFCA does not detract from
this conclusion.
21 5
the substitution of H.R. 14496 for the text of S. 2150. See 122 CONG. Ric. 33,817 (1976)
(statement of Sen. Randolph) (stating that "[f]ederal facilities will be subject to state law and
regulation, as under the Senate-passed bill"). The evolution of the language of a statute is
relevant to resolving ambiguity in its language. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-
24 (1983) (considering deletion of limiting provision prior to passage); Magee-Womens Hosp.
v. Heckler, 562 F. Supp. 483, 485 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (holding deletion of prior provision evidence
of intended meaning).
211. See FFCA, supra note 14, § 103, 106 Stat. at 1507 (including United States in
definition of "person"); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1) (1988) (making "person" subject to adminis-
trative orders or civil actions). Section 6928(a)(1) authorizes the EPA to "issue an order assessing
a civil penalty for any past or current violation, requiring compliance immediately or within a
specified time period, or both, or the Administrator may commence a civil action in the United
States district court in the district in which the violation occurred .... Id.
212. FFCA, supra note 14, sec. 102(b), § 6001(b), '106 Stat. at 1506.
213. Cf. supra notes 201-04 and accompanying.text (describing administrative order au-
thority provisions of FFCA).
214. See Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 ("[Where Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion") (quoting
United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)); United States v. Azeem,
946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that Congress's consideration of an issue in one context,
but not another, of same statute, implies that Congress intends inclusion only where indicated).
In the instant case, the federal facility provision of the RCRA, as amended by the FFCA,
expressly reaffirms the ability of the EPA to issue orders. The FFCA contains no similar
affirmation of the ability to engage in judicial enforcement actions. Therefore, Congress intended
to deny authority for the latter.
215. See H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 2, at 18, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1304
(stating that reason for changing definition of "person" in § 6001 is to make federal facilities
subject to all "enforcement mechanisms" applicable to nonfederal facilities). The inclusion of
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A second reason to conclude that the FFCA does not give the EPA
the power to sue another agency is the rule of statutory construction that
a court will construe a statute, whenever possible, so as to avoid raising
a constitutional question.21 6 An enforcement action in federal court by the
EPA against another agency would present constitutional concerns of both
the Article III and unitary executive variety.2 7 Currently, Executive Order
12,146 purports to resolve intrabranch disputes short of litigation by
requiring submission of the disputes to the Attorney General. This Order
could be construed as resolving the constitutional issue by providing the
prior consultation that the "weak" unitary executive theory demands.
Executive Order 12,146, however, falls short of the goal of providing
consultation. First, the Order is arguably applicable in only limited situa-
tions. 218 Second, Executive Order 12,088, the other Presidential directive
an "administrative enforcement action" section in the federal facility provision of the RCRA
raises significant questions about the plain meaning of the statute with regard to civil actions.
In such a case, resort to the legislative history and analysis of the statute as a whole is
appropriate. Homer v. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 815 F.2d 668, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
The vague reference to "enforcement mechanisms" is unhelpful because it does not clearly
include civil actions. The same portion of the House Report notes that the failure to include
the United States as a person led courts to believe that certain "enforcement mechanisms" did
not apply to the United States. H.R. REP. No. I1l, supra note 2, at 18, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1304. The cases referred to must be those, like Mitzelfelt, holding that
administrative order authority and citizen's suit for the collection of civil penalties did not apply
to the United States. See supra notes 85-105 (summarizing cases prior to Supreme Court decision
in Ohio).
When the legislative history is of no help in resolving the meaning of a statute, it is
appropriate to turn to other statutory construction tools. Gray v. Department of Labor, 943
F.2d 513, 516 (4th Cir. 1991); Adams v. Dole, 927 F.2d 771, 775 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 122 (1991). One tool is the notion that if a particular remedy is provided in one part of
the statute but not another, Congress intended the remedy to be excluded in the latter portion.
See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458
(1974) (stating principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another)).
216. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1989); see
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (discussing basis for rule of construction).
217. See CRS REP., supra note 174, at 51-59 (discussing potential constitutional problems
with civil action by one federal agency against another); Steinberg, supra note 6, at 341-52
(same); infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text (discussing justiciability problems with civil
action by one federal agency against another). See generally Rosenberg, supra note 190 (discussing
unitary executive theory in nonfederal facility context).
These commentators apply the test in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425
(1977). Nixon established a two part analysis for a separation of powers issue. The first inquiry
examines the extent to which the executive branch is prevented from completing its constitu-
tionally assigned functions. Id. at 443. Only if a potential exists for those functions to be
disrupted does the court need to determine whether the disruption is justified by an overriding
need to promote constitutionally permissible congressional objectives. Id. The balancing required
by Nixon makes the resolution of the separation of powers question even more uncertain.
218. See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 330 (arguing that Executive Order 12,146 would be
unhelpful in resolving enforcement problems). Executive Order 12,146 is ineffective because it
applies only to jurisdictional, legal disputes, and most enforcement issues involve factual disputes.
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addressing conflicts between federal agencies on environmental compliance
issues, does not guarantee prior resolution. 219 Third, even if both of these
mechanisms did work, they would only delay potential court resolution. 220
Therefore, the larger separation of powers issue that still remains is whether
an Article III court could ever hear a suit between executive branch
agencies.?'1 A court would essentially have to second guess the President's
decision that no separation of powers issue existed.m
The rule that courts should avoid constitutional questions when pos-
sible is triggered when such a question possibly exists?223 In Public Citizen
v. United States Department of Justice,24 the Supreme Court noted that
the presumption against creating a potential constitutional issue is even
stronger when separation of powers questions exist than when other
constitutional questions exist. 22 The threat of creating a constitutional
Id. at 329-30. Second, the Attorney General cannot bind the parties to any resolution because
the Attorney General cannot issue orders, only opinions. Id. Third, agencies may disregard
executive orders. See Raymond L. Chambers, The Executive Power: A Preliminary Study of
the Concept and of the Efficacy of Presidential Directives, 7 PRusIDENTiAL STUD. Q. 21, 29-32
(1977) (reporting on author's study results during Nixon era).
219. See Exec. Order No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1979), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (1988) [hereinafter Exec. Order 12,088]. Executive Order 12,088 is the only executive
order dealing specifically with the issue of federal compliance with environmental laws. The
Order establishes a system to resolve enforcement conflicts between agencies whereby conflicts
regarding environmental violations are referred to the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) if the Administrator cannot resolve them. Id. § 1-602. The flaw with this
mechanism is that another section states that this procedure is "in addition to, not in lieu of,
other procedures" to enforce pollution standards. Id. § 1-604. Conceivably, the EPA, under
the FFCA and Executive Order' 12,088, could notify OMB of a dispute and at the same time
initiate an action in district court.
220. See Martin v. Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Comm'n, No. 92-C-409-C, 1992
WL 300841, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 7, 1992) (agreeing with TVA interpretation of Executive
Order 12,146); TVA v. United States, 13 CI. Ct. 692, 701 (1987) (requiring that TVA submit
contract dispute between TVA and DOE to Attorney General under Executive Order 12,146
prior to court litigation). Thus, Executive Order 12,146 operates more as an exhaustion
requirement whereby opposing agencies must pursue all nonjudicial remedies prior to a court
entertaining a civil action.
221. A court could also frame the separation of powers issue as whether the "strong"
unitary executive is a correct interpretation of the Constitution.
222. See supra note 188 (suggesting one alternative for viewing separation of powers
problem and discussing hypothetical). A court's job is to say what the law is. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 368, 389, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). If no separation of powers issue exists,
the constitutional question of justiciability would also have to be passed upon: in this instance,
can the judiciary hear the case? Potentially, both the separation of powers and justiciability
inquiry could be combined in the context of the political question doctrine. See supra note 181
(discussing application of political question doctrine to intra-agency suits).
223. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466-67 (1989) (noting
but not resolving constitutional issue).
224. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
225. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 465-66; see Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) (holding that courts should read statutes to avoid serious doubt
of constitutionality).
In Public Citizen, the Court addressed whether the Federal Advisory Committee Act
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issue should induce a court to. interpret the vagaries created by the FFCA
and the RCRA so as to deny the EPA the statutory authority to bring
civil actions. Thus, a court will never reach the constitutional issue. Such
an interpretation is possible without resorting to disingenuous evasion. 226
Only two reasons could justify withholding authority from the EPA
to sue federal agencies. First, interested parties thought that the EPA
could sue. This is not the case. As early as 1978, the DOJ had taken the
position that the EPA suing another agency raised separation of powers
and justiciability concerns and was therefore unallowable.227 Witnesses
raised the issue at hearings held on federal facility compliance. 228 However,
Congress chose to affirm administrative order authority and not civil
action authority. Why Congress treated these two options differently, then,
is the question.
The only remaining explanation is that Congress withheld civil action
authority as a compromise to gain support for the bill. One commentator,
in a report written for a 1987 subcommittee hearing, concluded by indi-
(FACA) applied to consultations between the DOJ and the American Bar Association's (ABA)
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary regarding potential nominees for federal judgeships.
491 U.S. at 443. The ABA, when requested, submits confidential reports to the President on
the qualifications of potential nominees to the federal bench. Id. at 444. These reports aid the
President in choosing a nominee. Id. The FACA imposes a number of requirements on "advisory
groups" including opening meetings to public and keeping detailed minutes, later subject to
public inspection, of any meetings. Id. at 2562. Washington Legal Foundation (WLF), and later
the intervenor Public Citizen, sought to have the ABA committee declared an "advisory
committee" and thus subject to the FACA requirements. Id. at 447-48. The Court examined
the FACA's definition of "advisory committee." Id. at 452-53. The plain language of the
statute would compel an odd result and thus the Court utilized congressional intent in construing
the statute. Id. at 454-64. This inquiry led the Court to believe that the FACA's adoption
strongly suggested that Congress did not intend the definition to include the ABA committee.
Id. at 464. That significant separation of powers concerns would arise should the Court interpret
the FACA to include the ABA committee tipped the balance against the FACA's application.
Id. at 465. Accordingly, the Court held against WLF and Public Citizen. Id. at 467. The
concurrence would have held FACA applicable, but found the FACA as applied an unconsti-
tutional violation of the Appointments Clause. Id. at 481-82.
226. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985) (stating that "[w]e cannot press
statutory construction 'to the point of disingenuous evasion' even to avoid a constitutional
question") (quoting Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933)); supra notes 212-
15 and accompanying text (discussing application of expressio unius doctrine). Section 3008(a)
of the RCRA is not rendered meaningless because it still operates as against federal facilities
in the administrative order context and against nonfederal facilities in all other respects. Cf.
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2384 (1992) (stating that
courts must construe statute so as to give terms effect wherever possible).
227. Egan Memorandum, supra note 188, at 1 (revealing date of memorandum as June
23, 1978).
228. See Federal Facility Compliance With Hazardous Waste Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Superfund and Environmental Oversight of the Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1988) (statement of Dan Reicher, Natural Resources
Defense Council) (telling subcommittee that civil action authority was in question); Environ-
mental Compliance, supra note 49, at 281 (colloquy between Rep. Eckhart-a sponsor of
FFCA-and Richard Mays, EPA, and Henry Habicht, DOJ).
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cating that a political settlement could temper or moot the unitary executive
issue.? 9 Leaving the authority for the EPA to sue other agencies out of
the FFCA is consistent with an underlying political settlement. 2 0 With-
holding authority to sue also indicates that Congress deemed administrative
orders to be the best policy option to obtain federal facility compliance.
The key point is -that one can and should make a distinction between
administrative orders and civil actions. The former are constitutional while
the latter possibly are not. Furthermore, the FFCA arguably does not
authorize civil actions. Making the distinction allows one to readily un-
derstand the FFCA's purpose. Acting within constitutional constraints,
the FFCA allowed orders, disallowed civil actions, and thereby established
an overall effective enforcement mechanism.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Federal facility pollution problems are complex and multifaceted. On
the one hand is Congress's desire to treat federal polluters the same as
private polluters. On the other hand is the realization that two consider-
ations, sovereign immunity and the constitutionality of EPA enforcement,
make identical treatment of federal polluters impossible. The FFCA ad-
dresses these two considerations and has largely succeeded in resolving
federal facility pollution problems.
The FFCA is only a qualified success for two reasons. First, certain
inherent limitations to statutory response exist. For example, separation
of powers considerations correctly informed Congress's choice to withhold
civil action enforcement authority from the EPA. 2 1 Prosecutorial discre-
tion, especially at the federal level, is another constraint limiting statutory
response. Choosing when to enforce a law is inherently an executive
power2 2 that the FFCA does not purport to limit in any significant
manner.2 3 If the EPA chooses not to bring any enforcement actions, the
constitutional issues those actions trigger might remain shielded from court
229. CRS REP., supra note 174, at 66. A political settlement could temper the "weak"
unitary executive by providing for prior consultation, thus avoiding the question. The FFCA
provides prior consultation.
230. See In re Graven, 936 F.2d 378, 385 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that court must look to
object and policy of whole statute).
231. See supra notes 210-30 and accompanying text (arguing that proper interpretation of
FFCA denies EPA authority to initiate civil suits).
232. Cf. Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (noting executive power of independent
counsel). An agency's enforcement decision in any particular case generally is committed to
agency discretion and is thus unreviewable by courts. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988) (making
agency action committed to agency discretion by law unreviewable); Heckler v. Cheney, 470
U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (holding that agency decision to enforce generally unsuitable for review).
A reason for Heckler's decision was the similarity of an agency's decision to enforce to a
prosecutor's decision to indict-a decision within the President's control due to the Take Care
Clause. 470 U.S. at 832.
233. See FFCA, supra note 14, sec. 102(b), § 6001(b)(1), 106 Stat. at 1506 (directing that
if EPA pursues administrative order, it must do so like any order against private facility).
1993]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:801
decision. These limitations, however, are part of the costs that this nation
incurs for its system of separation of powers .234
Viewing the FFCA as a whole lessens the adverse effect of the
limitations above. 235 The EPA does have authority to issue administrative
orders. Subsequent enforcement of those orders is possible by a citizen's
suit or by states acting as a citizen under the citizen's suit provisions.2
6
This mechanism is constitutional because the necessary opportunity for
intrabranch consultation exists. 2 7 An enforcement-minded administration
has the statutory framework in place to address federal pollution should
it choose. 28 The FFCA gives states the full opportunity to use adminis-
trative orders and seek punitive civil penalties. 2 9 The FFCA thus obviates
234. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 710-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "[w]hile the
separation of powers may prevent us from righting every wrong, it does so in order to ensure
that we do not lose liberty"). In addition to protecting liberty at a certain cost, Justice Scalia
argued that the ability of the people to remove the President imposes the necessary check upon
the President's enforcement discretion. See id. at 728-29 (arguing that President will pay price
for selective or disproportionate prosecution). George Bush made federal facility compliance an
issue in the 1988 presidential campaign. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (quoting
George Bush during 1988 campaign). Future candidates for President could do the same.
235. See also Agencies Agree to Overhaul Federal Facility Cleanups to Ensure Public Input,
INs DE EPA WEEKLY REP., Dec. 25, 1992, at 1 (reporting recent agreement between EPA and
state agencies and citizens and environmental groups requiring federal agencies to create "site
specific advisory boards" at contaminated federal facilities). The new agreement provides a
mechanism for prioritizing the cleanup projects and also that all sites will "share equally" in
any future funding shortfalls. Id. at 6. Significantly, it encourages renegotiation of cleanup
milestones when agencies miss prior milestones rather than initiating enforcement actions. Id.
236. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (1988) (authorizing citizen's suit against United States
for violation of order).
237. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text (discussing constitutionality of EPA
administrative order authority under FFCA).
238. See Browner Portrayed as Hardworking, Results-Oriented, [Current Dev.] 23 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 2086, 2086 (Dec. 18, 1992) (describing new EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner
as pushing agency towards aggressive enforcement); William Booth, Everglades Accord Indicative
of EPA Designee's Approach, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1993, at A4 (describing Browner as
supportive of "very rigorous" enforcement). Federal compliance is not solely a Republican
problem. The DOJ, under the Carter Administration, took the position that civil actions against
sister agencies were not consistent with the Constitution. Egan Memorandum, supra note 188,
at 1; McConnell Letter, supra note 185, at 1. But see ROBERT F. DuAr, WHEtN GovEwMENr
ROuI TEs ITSELF 134 (1985) (describing successful Carter Administration actions relative to
TVA noncompliance and stating that enforcement was aided by President "positively disposed
toward regulatory goals").
239. See FFCA, supra note 14, § 102(a) (waiving immunity to state imposed fines). The
policy assumption underlying the FFCA, that punitive civil penalties will encourage federal
compliance as well as they do private, has not been extensively analyzed. See Steinberg, supra
note 6, at 321-23 (arguing that concern over constitutional and sovereign immunity issues has
prevented discussion of central issue of whether civil penalties are prudent mechanism to enforce
law upon federal polluter). At the federal level, any penalties exacted by the EPA with its new
administrative order authority, will simply be shifted from one account to another. Real deterrent
effect will only be from penalties exacted by states but those penalties will most likely be a
very tiny percentage of the agency's overall budget. See H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 2, at
14, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1300 (reporting average RCRA penalty collected was
FEDERAL FACILITY COMPLIANCE
the need for expensive and time consuming litigation. Finally, experience
demonstrates that criminal enforcement is an increasingly valid option.2 4 0
Even though the FFCA viewed as a whole can overcome the inherent
limits to statutory response, the second major flaw is not as easily
counterbalanced. The second major flaw is one of omission. The FFCA
does not go far enough in applying its overall effective system to statutes
other than the RCRA. The FFCA ignores the CWA, even though Ohio
indicated need for reform. The CAA and the CERCLA, while not directly
implicated in Ohio, are open to question in light of Ohio's hostile treatment
of immunity waivers.
The solution to this problem requires statutory reform. Ohio has raised
serious doubts about the sovereign immunity waiver provisions of the
CAA and the CERCLA. Republican Congressman Dan Schaeffer of Col-
orado recently introduced legislation to clarify the immunity waiver in the
CWA. 241 But Congressman Schaeffer's proposal amends neither the CAA
$4,750).
Advocates of penalties argue that penalties will bring violations to the attention of the
Congress by causing agencies adverse publicity and forcing them to explain the expenditure of
funds on fines. Axline et al., supra note 6, at 43-44. But mechanisms other than civil penalties
can generate adverse publicity. An agency head might have just as much difficulty explaining
why a large number of subordinates have been convicted of environmental crimes. Further, the
FFCA legislative history is indicative of the watchdog role environmental groups and states will
play when it comes to pointing out federal abuses of the environment.
President Bush corrected a potential problem with Congress's contemplated source of
payment for the fines. Congress had noted the existence of 31 U.S.C. § 1304 which provides a
permanent fund to pay judgments against the United States. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note
2, at 15-16, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1301-02. Under decisions of the Comptroller
General, if an agency disputes liability for the penalty, the fine ultimately imposed, if any, will
be paid from the judgment fund in 31 U.S.C. § 1304. 58 Op. Comp. Gen. 667 (1979). As the
President realized in signing the FFCA, this creates an incentive for noncomplying agencies to
litigate. Statement on Signing Legislation Waiving Sovereign Immunity Relating to Solid and
Hazardous Waste, 28 WEEKLY Comp. oF PRs. Doc. 1868, 1869 (Oct. 12, 1992). Pursuant to
presidential directive, the fines will now be paid from an agency's appropriation. Id.; see
Goewey, supra note 11, at 542-44 (discussing budgeting process). See generally Rami S. Hanash,
Environmental Compliance Within the Confines of the Federal Budgetary Process, 2 FED.
FAc.rrmEs ENvmL. J. 243 (1991) (discussing budgeting process and its impact on environmental
compliance); Rami S. Hanash, Effects of the Anti-Deficiency Act of Federal Facility Compliance
with Hazardous Waste Laws, [News & Analysis] 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,541
(Dec. 1988) (same).
240. See supra note 135 (discussing use of criminal sanctions against responsible federal
employees and deterrent effect thereof). Although the pace of federal employee prosecutions is
not as fast as those of private polluters, United States v. Dee does not appear to be the last
case involving a federal employee. See Dateline Justice, DOJ ALERT, June 1992, at 15, 17
(reporting CWA conviction and sentencing to 10 months in prison of John Curtis, former
director of Fuels Division at Adak Naval Air Station); see also United States v. Curtis, 988
F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming conviction of John Curtis and rejecting argument that CWA
does not apply to federal employees whose violations occurred during course of employment).
241. See H.R. 340, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (extending waiver in FFCA to CWA).
The prospects for passage this year are uncertain. See House Republican Seeks Waiver of
Federal Clean Water Act Immunity, INsiDE EPA WEEKLY REP., Jan. 15, 1993, at 17, 17
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nor the CERCLA. Congress should extend the clear language in the FFCA,
using Congressman Schaeffer's proposal as a vehicle, to amend the federal
facility sections in the CAA and the CERCLA.242
A second statutory response takes a broader approach. One commen-
tator recently argued that the problem is Congress's ad hoc reaction to
court decisions on sovereign immunity. 243 This is certainly true. For ex-
ample, Hancock v. Train244 prompted the amendment of the waiver sections
in the CAA and CWA. 245 Also, the increasing acceptance by district and
appeals courts of the DOJ argument on civil penalties roughly coincides
with the increased emphasis put upon the FFCA as it moved through
committees and towards passage. The court imposed rule requiring strict
construction of waivers contributed to Congress's reactive approach. 246 By
including a provision that overturns the strict construction rule, Congress
can move courts toward consistent interpretation of immunity waivers.2 7
Executive action is also possible. The President could clarify both
Executive Order 12,146 and Executive Order 12,088 to address the prob-
lems that arise in the context of EPA enforcement efforts against other
federal agencies. Specifically, President Clinton could abandon the use of
the Office of Management and Budget-in Executive Order 12,088-and
the DOJ-in Executive Order 12,146-as the adjudicating authorities for
intrabranch disputes. Instead, he could issue a new order that would give
the EPA and its new enforcement-oriented Administrator241 the final say
in agency disputes. This would give the EPA an effective enforcement
mechanism and also resolve who is accountable in cases when disputes
arise. The President's ability to remove the EPA Administrator assures
that the executive branch bureaucracy respects the policy goals the Presi-
dent advocates.
Other executive action could take the form of more general executive
orders exhorting the federal bureaucracy to comply with federal laws and
strategic use of the appointment power to place compliance-minded indi-
viduals in important agency positions.249 The Executive should place a
(discussing introduction of legislation). As of May 27, 1993, Westlaw BilIcast gave H.R. 340 a
one percent chance of passing the House Committee on Education and Labor and a one percent
chance of passing on the House floor.
242. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 6992e(a) (West Supp. 1992) (providing example of clear
waiver).
243. Murchison, supra note 55, at 201-02 (arguing that Congress has focused on solving
last judicial interpretation and not future problems); see Donnelly & Van Ness, supra note 67,
at 39 (noting that environmental laws contain unique waiver provisions that exacerbate inter-
pretation difficulties).
244. 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
245. Wolverton, supra note 6, at 581-82.
246. See Murchison, supra note 55, at 206 (stating that one impediment to effective waivers
is strict construction rule).
247. Id. at 207.
248. See supra note 238 (discussing appointment of Carol Browner as EPA Administrator).
249. See DURANT, supra note 238, at 134 (citing use of executive orders, appointments,
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higher priority on the use of federal criminal enforcement as well. 250
Ohio and the FFCA represent a crossroads for environmental compli-
ance by federal agencies. The FFCA pulls in the positive direction of
providing a range of enforcement options to federal and state regulators
who must deal with federal pollution. Ohio, however, simultaneously pulls
in the opposite direction due to its potential ill effects on other federal
facility provisions.
Given these two forces, the path from here is clear. Congress should
amend, in a uniform way, each environmental statute so that it expressly
and unambiguously waives sovereign immunity. Concurrently, the Presi-
dent should use the power of the Executive to create a "climate of
compliance expectations"' 25 in the executive branch. Combined congres-
sional and presidential action will bring federal facilities into compliance
and will stop the flow of pollution.
NELSON D. CARY
and speeches as tools used by Carter Administration to obtain TVA compliance with laws);
Executive Order on Pollution Prevention Sought by Bipartisan Group of 54 Senators, [Current
Dev.] 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3049, 3049-50 (Mar. 26, 1993) (reporting on Senators urging
adoption of an executive order that would require federal facilities to publicly report amount
of toxic waste generated at federal facilities and adopt other measures to decrease amount of
waste generated).
250. See supra note 135 (discussing usefulness of criminal sanctions in seeking federal
compliance).
251. DuRANT, supra note 238, at 134.
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